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Preface  
 
This thesis is about understanding causes of vulnerabilities leading to specific 
type of accidents on offshore oil and gas installations. Blow-out accidents 
have disastrous potential and exemplify accidents in advanced technological 
systems. The thesis aims to reveal dysfunctional mechanisms occurring within 
high reliability systems whether in organization or socio –technical interaction. 
Technological systems form a central place in technological development and 
as such this thesis is placed in the technology and society group part of the 
STS- field, though describing technological risks and accidents at group, 
organizational and industrial sector level.  
The contents are description on developments in offshore technological 
design, theories on how organisational vulnerabilities occur, empirical analysis 
on three major blow-out accidents, empirical analysis on one normal project 
for reference, sosio-technological historic description on development in 
Norwegian offshore industry and final analysis  
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1. Introduction   
 
1.1 Blow out accidents - Dramatic Accidents in   
 
 
“Sunday the 6 of October 1985 at 20 30 an uncontrolled blowout occurred on 
the semi-submersible drilling rig West Vanguard during exploration drilling on 
block 6407/6 on the Haltenbanken. A so called shallow gas blowout occurred 
during a routine drilling operation before sufficient progress was achieved to 
install a blowout safety valve.  
The gas diverter system of the rig did not withstand the forces of the blowing 
gas with it’s contained sand an solid particles and the gas flowed out onto the 
platform and were ignited. Explosion and fire caused grave damages. Of the 
80 persons onboard 79 were saved. The material damage to the rig runs into 
hundred s of millions Norwegian Kroner. … 
(NOU 16/86 West Vanguard report 1986:7-- authors  translation) 
 
Blow out accidents can be dramatic as illustrated above. These accidents are 
taking place on offshore oil& gas platforms, the technological systems, which 
should be of very high reliability. Accidents where  ultra costly modern 
technology fails to perform safely and lives are lost or put at risk and damages 
run up in hundreds of millions, what is a actually causing them ?  
 
1.2 Modern technology dysfunctions, accidents and vulnerability  
Describing side effects of technology in our contemporary society from quite 
different approaches the authors Ulrich Beck (1992) and Charles Perrow 
(1999) both find common ground in unintended negative effects of modern 
technological development. In his book Risk Society (Risikogesellschaft in its 
original language) Ulrich Beck (1992) attributes the general risks to humanity 
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as consequences of the development of modernity reflecting back at us, the 
humans and our human society. Beck describes the mechanisms and effects 
at the general level of society, but a central underlying notion is that 
technology develops into something so advanced and complex that humans 
and human society has problems understanding the consequences of 
development and controlling the effects of technology in society. In this thesis 
will not focus so much on this general level of society, but I will bring it back 
into the discussion in the final chapter.  
Before we leave the theory of Ulrich Beck I will just point out that energy and 
energy in the form of oil and gas are at the core of development of modernity. 
Assuming its central position as one of a few technologies central to the 
development of modernity, oil and gas technology it is reasonable to expect it 
to should show some of the core attributes Ulrich Beck describes in his book 
Risk Society.  
 
If we drop down in level of analysis and look at specific technologies and 
technological systems Charles Perrow also writes about negative side effects 
of technology. According to Perrow’s book Normal Accidents (1999) all 
technologies has inherent weaknesses causing accidents. Accidents will then 
become a normal consequence of the choice to apply a given technology. All 
technologies are accident prone, the degree dependent on the two central 
dimensions Perrow calls complexity and coupling.  
 
Perrow describes complexity is the opposite to linearity in the functions of a 
given system (ibid 77-78). When there are conditions of linearity the outcome 
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effects of an abnormal incident/accident on the rest of the systems is 
foreseeable. In conditions of complexity we find the opposite, the outcome 
effects of an abnormal incident/accident on the rest of the systems is not fully 
foreseeable. Abnormal incident/accident s can cause surprising secondary 
effects for the operators or those who designed the system.  
 
Coupling determines the possibility of recovering from a mistake or error. 
Loose coupling means that an incident/accident causing failure of a sub-
system will be isolated to that sub-system and not spread to the rest of the 
system. Physical distance or internal boundaries will prevent ripple effects.  
If coupling is tight an incident/accident in one sub-system, what Perrow calls 
component failure accidents (ibid:70), can not be contained and negative 
effects are determined to lead to lead to new component failure accident(s) in 
other sub-system(s) in proximity or in contact with the sub-system that initially 
failed. This will continue in one way or another through the system and lead to 
major systemic accidents. In open or de-coupled systems the elements are 
not so close in relation and the system will give the systems operators a 
possibility to contain the error without the error starting a chain effect running 
through or across the technological system.  
 
With Perrow we now se a shift from general description of negative effects to 
description of negative effects specified to certain technologies and the 
technologies inherent system attributes. We can also se a shift from general 
negative effects of technology, to negative effects of technology in the form of 
accidents.  
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Is this technological determinant approach reasonable?  Do system accidents 
come out as output of a linear function of dependent only on the chosen 
technology and its inherent technical and social structure?  What about the 
quality of social - technical interaction? Do social actions within the 
organization manning the technological system cause differences? What 
about the effect of surroundings on a given technological system? Do we find 
effects in accident risk not determined solely by technological structure, but 
differences between the technological systems within a given technology?   
 
Research objects and research question   
I have selected the offshore oil and gas industry with its contained, compact 
and quite complex technological systems of offshore oil/gas drilling and 
production rigs/platforms as suitable examples of technological systems to 
study.  
I will focus the thesis on blow-out accidents as a type of accidents that are 
both systemic in character and with potential to be catastrophic to the entire 
technological system and to a degree damaging to the surroundings. 
The contexts of the accidents will form a central part of my analysis and I 
have limited my thesis to look at major blow-out accidents on the Norwegian 
Continental shelf (Norwegian sector) of the North Sea and Norwegian Sea  
 
I want to find out how weaknesses in the organization and techno-social 
interaction of operations within a technological system cause exposure to 
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accidents and how outside conditions affect the technological system and 
expose it to risk for accident 
 
Blow-out accidents and why blow-out accidents are good examples of 
accidents in modern technological systems  
A blow-out accident is a common name for uncontrolled release of 
hydrocarbons (gas, gas condensate and oil) from an oil/gas production line.  
The main components of such a production line are: 
- the reservoir of oil/gas (and water) contained within rock formations 
deep underground,  
- the drilled well running deep under ground into the reservoir,  
- the production control equipment in the form of pipes and valves 
connected to the well/reservoir,  
- the processing facilities separating water and dividing oil/gas into 
useful substances and finally  
- storage and loading facilities or connection to transport pipes for the 
separated oil and gas.    
 
When oil and gas are produced off the shore, the technical facilities for 
production, production control and supportive facilities are usually but not 
always contained within a rig/platform.  
 
 
 
By definition a blow-out accident is an uncontrolled loss of oil and/or gas 
under pressure that happens from the reservoir and/or the production line 
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before the oil and gas enters the processing facilities for separation of water 
and division into its useful components of crude oil and gas. An uncontrolled 
loss after the oil/gas/water has entered the process facilities is called a 
process leak and is by definition not a blow out accident.   
 
The oil/gas industry is by common designation divided into two major 
segments, the upstream and downstream segments. Upstream are the 
segment where crude oil and gas, whether dry or liquefied, are extracted from 
the ground and processed and made ready for transport. The downstream 
segment is where the crude oil are refined and distributed to users or where 
the gas is transported to end users. And for the sake of order, I focus solely 
on the upstream part, loss of containment during downstream operations are 
not within the scope of this thesis.  
 
From a techno – social perspective offshore oil/gas platforms as technological 
systems are interesting and relevant to study for a set of reasons.  
The conditions of (relatively) deep sea call for few isolated systems in the 
form of platforms/rigs where technical artefacts for several critical functions 
are placed in a spatially small system, so we get to study technological 
system within clear physical boundaries. Offshore rigs/platforms are also by a 
systemic description quite complex and tightly coupled according to Perrow’s 
(1999) criteria. In Perrow’s classification on level of accident, a blow-out will 
rank as a component failure accident, but due to the tight coupling onboard 
most offshore platforms, chances are high that a blow-out accident can 
develop into a system accident, damaging or destroying the whole system.  
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These offshore rigs/platforms are also functionally centred round the 
production line running from the oil and/or gas reservoir. Deep down in the 
reservoir we find the untamed forces of nature in the form of high pressure oil 
and/or gas containing waste amounts of energy. The offshore platform/rig 
forms a technological system that is tying together nature’s forces with human 
utilization by the use of human engineering knowledge. This gives this type of 
technological systems a relevant position in the human–technology – 
knowledge perspective. As mentioned earlier oil and gas production are 
central in fuelling the modern technologies of modern society. This places the 
study objects in a relevant position in relation to discussions on effects of 
technological development in modern society.   
 
 
Blow outs as accidents are very interesting as accident-type for a number of 
reasons: 
- the potential forces of destruction are present  within this bounded 
technical system and not coming from the outside like for instance a 
ship colliding into an oil/gas rig/ platform.  
- blow-outs unlike the other types of accidents with disastrous 
potential happen at the boundary between natural objects and 
technical artefacts and human ability to sense and interpret nature 
are relevant to understanding consequences of actions and thereby 
relevant for safe operations  
- the accident form has potential for destroying the whole facility  
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- this type of accident is dangerous to those Perrow define as first, 
second and fourth party participants1 (Perrow:1999: 67-68)  
- environmental consequences to the surrounding sea can be 
substantial  
 
Blow-out accidents do not show up in the statistics as the largest danger 
during offshore oil and gas operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(NCS). During the 41 years of offshore oil/gas operations on the NCS, blow 
outs have not been a major “killer”. Only one person has been killed in a 
major blow-out accident during this period2, compared to two digit numbers of 
deaths in accidents stratified in the categories of heavy lifts/dropped objects 
or diving accidents. The clearly largest cause of deaths is the sc. Alexander 
Kielland accident of 1980 when 123 persons died following a breakdown in 
structure and capsizing of a floating rig. 
 
Still the potential of a major disastrous accident is evident. There are three 
major problems with blow-outs that can cause grave dangers. The first is that 
the gas or vapours from leaking oil can ignite and burn/explode. Such 
explosions can cause major destruction to platforms/rigs and lead to loss of 
substantial number of lives. The other major danger is that major streams of 
leaking gas can erode the sea-bed under those types of platforms standing on 
                                                 
1 - First party victims are those who carry out the work in direct relation to the accident,  
- second party those who participate within the system and benefits from it , but do not have 
direct influence on the work being carried out,  
- third party are victims who does not participate within the system and benefit from its 
operation, but just happen to receive the worst consequences of the actions , and fourth party 
victims are future generations that in a negative way become affected by consequences of an 
accident  
2 During the West Vanguard accident which we will look into below 
9 
9 
the sea-floor and cause them to tilt over. The third problem with potential for 
disaster is that major gas leaks into the water can cause a floating rig/ship to 
get stability problems and cause the rig/ship to capsize or sink.  
Only ship collisions, structural breakdowns and explosions in onboard process 
facilities rank equal to blow-outs as accident with potential disastrous 
destructive consequences to a rig/platform.  
 
As there are generally a substantial degree of similarity in offshore oil/gas 
operations over the world these illustrations acts as examples of the severity 
of blow-out accidents.    
 
The first example, selected from the World Offshore Accident Database 
(WOAD) run by the Norwegian safety consultant company Veritas, can 
illustrate the severity of blow-out accidents: 
 
“During well completion operations the platform suffered a blowout and 
fire….some 45 people were evacuated from the platform…The 
platforms self contained drilling rig “Sundowner XV” was totally 
destroyed in the fire  and will not be repaired”  On jan 27th (three days 
after the initial blow-out, authors comment) the fire was  still out  of 
control. After 4 days the well was still blowing….The well was capped 
12th of February (19 days after the initial blow-out, authors comment) 
(WOAD ref: Eugene Island 3 80/A-1 1996 -05-24/002)    
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Fig 1,2,3 Below are three pictures of the platforms during and after the accident, Sundowner 
XV laying wrecked across the smallest of the two platforms, Eugene Island   
 
 
Another example:  
The third of June 1979 the crew of Sedco 135Fwere drilling the IXTOC I well 
for PEMEX, the state-owned Mexican petroleum company off the coast of 
Mexico. During operation the crew nad tig suffered a blowout. Attempts to 
shut inn the well failed. Oil and gas flowed to surface where it later ignited and 
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engulfed the Sedco 135F in flames. The rig collapsed onto the wellhead 
littering the seabed with large pieces of debris  
The well initially flowed 30 000 barrels (approx 4,7 million liters- authors 
comment) of oil a day gradually sinking to 10 000 barrels (1,6 million liters - 
authors comment) a day. In spite off over 500 aerial missions to spray the oil 
slick with dissolvent, the oil slick measured at the largest 180 by 80 km. Large 
areas of the southern US coastline were contaminated.  
The well was capped 23 of march 1980, 9 months after the initial blow out, 
after drilling of two relief wells. This is the accident with the biggest single spill 
known, estimated to a release of 3.5 million barrels (556 million liters - authors 
comment) of oil.  (Versatel-1)  
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Fig 4 (Upper left) the Sedco 135F rig that sunk after explosive fires,  
Fig 5&6 (Upper right and lower centre) The Sedco 135F /IXTOC blow out. Pictures showing 
oil/gas flow with fire and clearly visible oil slick. The other platforms are drilling relief wells. 
The Sedco 135F platform is at the time of the pictures sunk © Both Versatel  
 
A third example illustrating how floating rigs of the type frequently used on the 
NCS can be affected. This accident also illustrates how quickly a blow-out can 
develop into a grave accident. 
On the 22 September 1988 the crew of Ocean Odyssey drilling in the UK 
sector for the oil company ARCO lost control of the well resulting in a blow 
out. The blow-out caused gas to leak out and explode. During dramatic 
circumstances with explosions raging the 67 man crew hastily abandoned 
ship with eight persons having to jump overboard from the rig. One crew went 
missing onboard the platform during evacuation and were killed in the 
fire/explosion(s). The rig was severely damaged, spent a long time in the yard 
an was later rebuilt for other purposes (Versatel-2)  
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Fig 7, 8 Ocean Odyssey blow-out and fire © Canadian wellsite © japt  
 
The fourth example illustrates the dangers posed of loss of buoyancy and/or 
stability due to gas in the sea. On the 27th of August 1981 during drilling 
operations on the in the South China-sea the crew of the drill ship Petromar V 
hit a shallow gas pocket. The resulting blow-out with gas in sea caused the 
drill ship to lose stability and capsize. (Versatel-3) 
 
 
Fig 9-12 Blow-out and capsizing of Petromar V drill ship © Research and training Centre – 
Australia  
 
Low average risk  
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Statistically spoken blow-out accidents are rare. The combined figures derived 
from offshore oil/gas operations in the Norwegian sector (NCS), UK sector 
and the US sector of the Golf of Mexico (GOM) which forms the most reliable 
statistical data available, places the risk of blow-out accidents per year in 
production per oil/gas well at an average rate of  0.000047 (Holand:2006:74).  
The risk of blow-out per drilled and completed production well is 0,00327 3  
and for drilling an exploration well is 0,00516 (ibid 73-74).  
The probability of ignition of oil/gas that are leaking out during a blow-out is on 
average 0.136 per blow-out (ibid:22) 
 
Looking at these numbers and knowing that many blow-out releases of oil 
and/or gas are so small that most people will conceive them as “leaks” the 
statistical risk of a major blow out accident is so small that for most of us it is 
hard to conceive.  
 
As example: 
One of the largest types of offshore platforms can have as many wells as 
approximately 60.  
Calculated, the average risk of experiencing a blow-out in a given operational 
year if we exclude the drilling of wells are 60 x 0,000047 = 0,00282 per 
operating year. Or described another way 1/0,00282 =354,6 which means one 
blow out in every 354,6 years on average.   
                                                 
3 For drilling a development (production) well Holand places the average risk of blow-out to 
0.00250. In addition comes a risk component of completion calculated to 0.00077. 
Completion is necessary for all production wells. The value of the added risk components 
then become 0,00327 for drilled and completed development (production) wells.   
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Knowing that it is on average only 0.136 chance of ignition, the accident risk 
of a blow- out with fire and explosion for a rig with 60 wells and no drilling 
activity is 0,00282 x 0,136 = 0,000384 per operating year  or on average, one 
major accident with fire and explosion in 2607,4 operating years.  
 
Taking these numbers into consideration and remembering that these are 
average figures with limited value to an individual case, offshore oil/gas 
platforms must in relation to blow-out accidents still be considered as high 
reliability systems. Remembering the potential severity of blow-out accidents 
illustrated above, we talk about systems of high-reliability, but with disastrous 
potential.  
 
Vulnerability 
During 41 years of offshore operation on the NCS there have only been three 
major blow-out accidents4, a very small number of accidents/incidents.  When 
looking in detail, as an investigation committee or board of inquiry does, 
offshore oil/gas platforms/rigs are large and complex systems with a multitude 
of technical and human input variables.  
Looking at the multitude of detailed input variables and considering the low 
probability of this type of accidents, finding reason to generalize based on 
exactly how a given blow-out accident started will be difficult. The answer can 
be and most likely will be that there is a specific and almost unique 
combination of technical malfunctions and/or certain set of specific human 
actions that triggered the particular blow-out accident.  
                                                 
-4the Bravo accident of 22nd  April 1977, 
- the West Vanguard accident of  6th October 1985 and  
- the Snorre A blow-out incident 28th November 2004 
We will return to these accidents in section 1.3 and chapter 4  
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We can expect these technical malfunctions and/or human actions are closely 
related to that particular technical system and if we try to transfer the set of 
causes to another blow out accident in another technical system, we will not 
be able to find the exact same variables. The set up of the technological 
system or organization is too specific to the case. Our ability to generalise on 
causes, even with our specific strata of accidents will be poor.  
 
Instead of acting like a second investigating committee and just re-trace the 
findings in identifying the detailed causes or combination of causes leading to 
accidents I will base my approach on the article “An Approach to Vulnerability 
Analysis of Complex Industrial Systems” by Setfan Einarsson and Marvin 
Rausand (1998)  
The central notion in the article is to look for vulnerabilities exposing the 
system instead of looking directly for causes.  
 
“The vulnerability concept is used to characterize a systems lack of 
robustness or resilience with respect to various threats, both within and 
outside the boundaries of the system” (ibid:535). 
 
Notice her that Einarsson and Rausand also talks about looking for both 
internal and external input variables. Einarsson and Rausand does not 
explicitly state if the internal or external input variables shall be on the same 
or differing societal level(s). Interpreting from their figure (ibid: 537) I 
understand external factors to be of both similar and higher societal levels (for 
instances Market or Society but also Infrastructure).  
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Further on the relation between vulnerability and risk: “Vulnerability may be 
considered as the “opposite” of robustness and resilience, in the same way as 
risk is the “opposite” of safety” (ibid 536).  
 
So far I have described the reasons for why I want to study blow-out accidents 
in offshore oil and gas production systems, illustrated the danger potential of 
blow-out accidents and outlined the reasons for focusing on vulnerabilities to 
accidents rather than direct causes.  
Now I will turn to how I intend to study these accidents.  
 
 
1.3 Methods  
I intend to carry out a multiple cross case study of the social and socio- 
technical causes of vulnerabilities exposing technological systems of offshore 
oil and gas operations on the NCS to blow-out accidents. I will do this by 
looking at a set of internal causes for social disruptions, and external 
conditions surrounding the technological systems as well as interactions 
between relevant elements across the boundary of the technological systems. 
I will focus on the time immediately before or running up to the accident.  
The findings in the three cases, I will compare them to a normal situation in an 
offshore development project where there has been no blow-out accident. 
Finally I will try to analyse how the findings describe conditions of vulnerability 
in offshore oil/gas technological systems. I will also to a limited degree 
generalise into how these vulnerabilities in technological systems can be 
understood and how the associated risks fit into a larger picture of risk to the 
individual.  
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Chapter two is an introduction to technological designs of platforms/rigs in use 
on the NCS and introduction to wells and drilling techniques.  
The reason for this chapter is fourfold  
- It gives a background to understanding the technical aspects of the 
blow-out accidents  
- It shows system structures that are relevant to understand the 
problem of complexity and coupling and the potential for disastrous 
consequences of blow-outs.  
- It illustrates the rapid technological development and diversity of oil/ 
gas drilling and production facilities. This is relevant for 
understanding both the crews’ situation in operating the technical 
items onboard and the control authorities’ challenges in keeping up 
with development.  
- Relevant for as background when discussion the social influences 
on development on technological (technical and organizational) 
structures  
 
In chapter three I will describe a set of five social theories relevant for 
understanding disruptions of the social organization exposing for 
vulnerabilities leading to accidents. These theories form basis for the analysis 
in the two following chapters.  
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The fourth chapter is an analysis of the investigation reports/analysis from the 
three major blow-out accidents that has happened in the offshore oil/gas 
operations on the NCS. The three accidents are;  
- the Bravo accident of 22nd  April 1977, 
- the West Vanguard accident of  6th October 1985 and  
- the Snorre A blow-out incident 28th November 2004  
I will analyse the findings from the accident/incident reports based on the five 
social theories described in chapter three. I will also check for indications of 
complexity based on the theory of Perrow  (se section 1.2). For the purpose of 
later analysis I will also look for indications on effect of safety authorities 
control in the time leading up to the incident/accident.  
 
In chapter five I will analyse conditions in a normal offshore development 
project by the same theoretical basis as I use in chapter four. The reason for 
this is to form a basis of normal operations.  
In the last section of chapter five I will discuss across the three accident cases 
from chapter four and the case of normal operation in chapter five.  
The purpose is twofold; to identify if there are inside causes of vulnerability 
running across time and the three accidents and secondly to identify if there 
are conditions not related to accidents, but inherent vulnerabilities in the 
industry as a whole.  
If there are clear differences between operating conditions leading up to 
accidents and normal operation then I can explain the causes of vulnerability. 
Are there similar organizational conditions across accidents and normal 
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successful operations, this will serve as a strong indicator that there are 
general inherent structural causes for vulnerability in the industry.  
 
The sixth chapter will open with an introduction to theoretical foundations for 
understanding the influence of context on accident vulnerability.  
In the second section I will look for the broader techno-social history of the 
Norwegian offshore oil/gas industry. That conditions set out by the social 
surroundings affect the technological system will be a central basis for further 
discussion.  
 
Chapter seven is divided in three sections  
The first section is where I intend analyse the findings from chapter four 
(accidents) and compare with the techno-historical context in the time leading 
up to the accidents. I will try to identify effects indirectly causing conditions of 
vulnerability across external - internal boundary of the technological systems 
 
In the second section of the seventh chapter I will look at all the accident 
cases and see if there are general key features in the techno-social 
interrelationship running along the different cases. If I find indications that the 
operation conditions that lead to accidents are existent across accident cases 
and normal operating conditions this is an indication that there are indirect 
causes of weaknesses across time in the general system of the Norwegian 
offshore industry (considering that I have chosen relevant theoretical 
background for my analysis).  
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In section three I will reintroduce the general basic notions from Beck’s Risk 
Society and discuss how my findings are relevant for understanding risk 
distribution in society.  
 
 
1.4 Definition of key terms  
Technological system: A system consisting of both physical artefacts and 
organized humans. The system can contain and have boundaries to natural 
objects. The technological system can set premises for human technical 
interactions within the system. A technological system is constituted around a 
(set of) purpose(s) and a (specific set of) technology which is a part of 
defining the system. 
(NOTE: This definition takes up the social, technical and knowledge 
integration from Hughes founding article on large technological systems 
(Hughes 1993) . But by avoiding the “large” I want to utilize the social, 
technical and knowledge aspects of Hughes description while I 
simultaneously want to limit the physical size and find natural self-explaining 
boundaries for a given technological system 
 
Technical (structure): Man made physical structure that forms the physical 
man made part of a technical system. The outer physical limits of the 
technical structure will play a considerable, but not definite role in defining the 
boundary for the technological system.  
 
Technical design: Deliberate design, selection of physical components and 
the ordering of the component’s internal relations within a given technical 
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system. Technical design does not include social organizations, but can affect 
the structure of the organization manning the technological system. Technical 
design is dependent on available knowledge and production techniques. 
Technical design will most likely be affected by demands and selection 
mechanisms in the social surroundings through all phases of the technical 
designs life cycle.     
 
 
Organization: The social organization of the group of people manning a given 
technological system. Organization spans both formal and informal 
organization. 
 
(Social) surroundings: The social conditions surrounding the technological 
system. In some cases this can include how the surrounding social elements 
perceive the natural surroundings of a given technological system.   
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2 The technical – Offshore Platform Designs and Well 
Technique  
 
The role of looking at technical designs in this thesis   
In this chapter there is a general introduction and then a focus on the 
development in technical design of rigs/platforms and on drilling technique. All 
three parts are relevant as background reference when reading chapter four 
on the experienced blow-out accidents. Technical development and design 
choices in the areas of rigs/platforms and wells are also directly relevant to 
the notions of complexity and coupling as described by Perrow (1999) and as 
such the potential for accidents and the potential extent of damages in case of 
an accident.  
Looking at technical design development also serves a tertiary purpose. This 
chapter serves as reference for discussion of the large scale socio-technical 
development discussed in chapter six. The development of technical 
structures reflects back on the social circumstances the design was 
developed under and functions as indicators of development in social 
structures, relevant for the final discussion in chapter seven. 
I suggest that this chapter (chapter two) is keep at hand and used for 
comparison when reading section 6.2   
 
 
2.1 The Major Components in the Offshore oil/gas Production Line  
Schematically spoken the offshore production line of oil and or gas consists of 
four elements, oil/gas deposit, well, well control line/equipment and 
processing with storage/offloading facilities.  
 
24 
24 
An underground reservoir is where gas and water and often also oil are 
trapped in porous layers of permeable rock under more solid layers of dense 
rock. These layers can be from some hundred meters to several thousand 
metres below the sea bed. Usually the layers containing oil/gas have 
thickness in the range of some tenths of meters up to some hundred meters. 
A deposit is usually much larger in horizontal than vertical direction. The 
geological structure can be complex with several pockets and dividing layers 
within a reservoir.  
Contrary to common beliefs the deposits do not only contain gas or oil, oil, 
gas and water are lying in separate layers in the deposits.  Due to the 
differences in specific gravity the gas is always on top and water on the 
bottom. Not all deposits contain oil, on the NCS it is quite normal with deposits 
with only gas and water. In all reservoirs the gas on top provides a high 
pressure.  
 
Oil is always mixed with gas and water (and often some sand) when it is 
produced.  
Gas is also a mix of dry (gaseous) gas and liquefied gas. Some water, gas 
bonded with water and sand usually is present in the production stream.  
 
 
The well, is a drilled hole of varying diameter in the rock formation. The upper 
section is widest and then the well becomes slightly narrower in a few steps 
toward the reservoir.  Inside the well, the drillers lower a steel pipe called 
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casing and cement the outside of this casing to the surrounding rock. A 
common dimension of casing is 9 5/8 inch (approx 24,5 cm).  
Inside the well piping for containing the production flow of oil/gas called tubing 
is run. The volume outside the tubing is called the annulus. Both the volume 
inside the tubing and the annulus is closely monitored for pressure to keep 
control of the production and for safety. There can be different valves in the 
tubing regulating the well stream. One type of well is the Down hole safety 
valve (DHSV) which is a valve that can act as a safety valve to close the well.   
 
 
Fig 13 This illustration gives a fair picture of the dimensions of the large oil/gas platform 
(approx 200m high), the sea and the oli/gas deposits (on this illustration of the thicker type). 
The dimensions of the wellbore of the oil/gas wells are of course grossly exaggerated 
 
By the top end of the well we find the wellhead. At the wellhead we find a set 
of strongly dimensioned control valves called the x-mas tree. The x-mas tree 
can either be placed on the deck of  a platform with a marine riser with the 
tubing inside running down to the sea floor (the traditional type of structure) or 
there can be a sub-sea x-mas tree on a frame attached to the well at the sea 
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floor (the newer sub-sea type). This type of sub-sea x-mas tree is run by 
remote control and the wellstream run through piping to the processing unit at 
the platform. Sub-sea wellhead units can be placed directly below a platform 
or at some distance out to the side of the platform in separate sub-sea 
modules.  
 
From the wellhead the production stream goes through piping to the 
processing plant. Here sand, water gas and oil are separated. Except for the 
first years of operation on the NCS, it has been common to pump the water 
and/or some of the gas back into the reservoir through what is called an 
injection well to keep up the pressure inside the reservoir.  
The separated crude oil is usually stored in onboard tanks or pumped directly 
over to a ship for transport to refining.  
In later years gas is separated into dry gas and liquefied gas and transported 
through one of the sub-sea pipelines into the large gas transport system 
running through several pipes to onshore facilities in Norway, Germany, 
Belgium, France and the UK 
 
 
2.2 On the Drilling and Maintenance of Wells  
Drilling  
There are in principle two types of drilling; Exploration5 drilling to verify the 
existence, size or quality of a field and development drilling to develop wells 
for production or establish extra wells into a deposit already in production. The 
                                                 
5 Ther are two sub divisions to Exploration called Wildcating (finding/ verifying the existence 
of a field and appraisal which is  to verify the extent of already confirmed  field 
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general principles for drilling and completion are the same for both types. 
Exploration drilling is done with moveable drill rigs/ship (se next section) 
without processing equipment.  
Development drilling can be done from a stationary platform with capacity for 
both production and drilling. To drill a development well for a platform without 
drilling capacity or a sub-sea well unit (se next section) requires a separate 
drilling rig/ship.  
 
Basic to all the drilling is a rotary movement provided by the rotary drive on 
the drill deck (old type) or a top drive in the derrick (tower over the drill deck) 
(new type). A drillstring consisting of sections of steel pipe running down from 
the drive and into the well, the drillstring is power rotated. In the down-hole 
end there is a drill bit. Sections of pipe can be added to the drillstring as one 
drill deeper. Below the rig/platform and down to the seabed well head runs a 
tube outside the drillstring called a riser. During drilling the riser connects to 
the top of the well so the well practically ends on the drilldeck of the 
rig/platform.  
Initially a large diameter top-hole is drilled downwards from the seabed. When 
the top-hole (upper part of the well which can run for a several hundred 
meters) is finished a and the first casing segment is cemented in place, a 
Blow Out Preventer (BOP) can be installed. The BOP is a huge set of valves 
that can shut in the well even under high pressure. Most but not all BOPs 
have shear rams which can by hydraulic power cut of the drillstring and lock in 
the well.  
28 
28 
The BOP can be placed on top of the well on the deck of the rig/ platform (old 
style) or be placed at the well head on the sea floor and be remotely operated. 
(new style) 
For the rest of the operation the drillstring and casing/ tubing to be installed 
will run through the BOP.   
For the sequences of drilling where there is no BOP or in case of complete 
failure, some types of rigs are equipped with a diverter system that can send 
gas directly to the side of the platform.  
To hold back eventual pockets of gas or the gas/oil in the reservoir hit during 
the drilling, the drill operators are dependent on the mud. Mud is fluid pumped 
into the drill hole to give weight and pressure to hold back gas or liquids under 
pressure down in the drill-hole. The specific gravity and hence the weight of 
the mud can be altered by changing the composition. To cool the drill bit, 
remove crushed rock substance and vent out minor amounts of gas mud is 
circulated through the well during drilling operations  
 
With the upper part of the well completed and the BOP in place the drilling 
continues and can reach large depths. There are techniques to control the 
direction of drilling precisely. The vertical angle and direction in azimuth can 
be precisely adjusted with a positional accuracy of less than 1 meter during 
drilling.  
To keep the pressurised oil/gas under secure control there is an industry 
standard to always keep two barriers to secure against blowouts during the 
main phase of the drilling. The normal way to do this is to rely on the weight 
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and pressure of the mud combined with leak proof casing to form the first 
barrier, the second barrier is the BOP.  
Other solutions can be a Down Hole Safety Valve (DHSV) that can come in 
some different shapes and is locked to the sides of the well acting as one 
barrier.    
 
 
Completion  
When the well is drilled a completion phase takes place. During the 
completion phase the well is cleaned out and all the underground equipment 
like different screens, packers (sealing off parts of the well), internal tubing 
and different types of valves are installed inside the well. Completion is 
usually carried out by the same type of rig/platform as the one used for 
drilling. In the final stages of completion the well is opened to the reservoir by 
puncturing some designated areas of the casing. Then the well is tested for 
Fig 14 On the drill deck, two operators checking a large bore drill bit © Hydro 
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pressure integrity of the whole system and the wellflow is checked before the 
well is ready for production. 
 
Workovers (Maintenance) 
Workovers are the industry’s own word for major down-hole maintenance in a 
well. Maintenance to down-hole equipment is done much in the same way as 
drilling. Mud is pumped inn to “kill” the well (balance the pressure). The top-
side safety valves are removed and equipment can be run down the well in 
order to change, clean up or remove what’s necessary. After the down-hole 
operation is finished the well head is closed and mud is pumped out, the well 
is cleaned up, tested for integrity and production is opened much the same 
way as after drilling.  
Wireline equipment is different specialized tools run on a wire inside the well 
that can be used either during major workovers when the well is killed or by a 
special technique when the well is in production.  
 
2.3 Development of Rig/Platform Designs on the NCS  
 
Background  
When offshore activity started with exploration drilling on the NCS in 1966 the 
techniques and technology were imported from US oil companies operation 
the Golf of Mexico. There the first independent platforms off the coast had 
been developed through the two previous decades.  
The technical solution to producing oil/gas off the shore was to put the drilling 
equipment, control valves & piping and the associated processing equipment 
on a platform raised above the sea. Add control room, workshops, living 
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quarters & galley, cranes to load/offload equipment, helicopter deck and fire-
fighting equipment and the almost self contained oil/gas platform is complete.  
 
The first of a long series of major oil/gas platforms on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS), the platforms on the Ekofisk field, were installed in 
the early 1970s. They were installed at approx 70 meters depth on the 
southern part of the NCS. Already during the introduction of oil/gas production 
on the NCS in the early 1970s the offshore equipment and procedures 
brought in from the GOM had to be modified. Soon Norwegian and UK 
companies started to produce own designs. First own designs in floating rigs 
followed by the specially developed Condeep concept (se below). From being 
an initial importer of technical items originally developed for use in the GOM, 
the Norwegian offshore industries gradually developed new technical designs. 
Influential in the development of new designs were also the gradual 
movement of the industry into deeper waters further north in the North Sea.  
 
The eight distinct types of design6 of offshore rigs/platforms in use on 
the NCS   
 
Below, the description and illustrations of the different designs are listed in the 
order they appeared on the NCS. 
                                                 
6 of FMC technologies introduced me to this way of describing design steps in design of 
platform/rig structures during a conversation in October 2006  
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The first is the semi-submersible floating drill rig  
     
 
 
This type of rig is floating and moveable by its own engines. There are no 
processing/production facilities onboard, except equipment control valves (x-
mas three) and BOP to shut in a well. It is used both for drilling wells and for 
maintenance operations (workovers). When positioned at the drill site, the rig 
is anchored by 12 to 16 anchors and lowered in the sea for stability during the 
drilling operation.  
This technical design was imported from the US with the introduction of 
offshore exploration drilling on NCS in 1966. This general design is today 
common on all major offshore oil/gas provinces  
 
A version that by appearance looks different, but in principle of the overall 
design and tasks is similar is the drill ship. 
 
Drill ships and on some occasion later models of rigs have dynamic 
positioning (DP) equipment for operations in waters to deep for anchoring. DP 
is a control system utilizing a type of precision positioning system coupled to a 
set of motors and propellers. This DP-system can in spite of wind, waves and 
Fig 15& 16  Floating semi-submersible drill rig  © Transocean  © Statoil 
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currents hold the rig/vessel in a position with sufficient precision to carry out 
drilling.  
  
 
 
The second is the steel jacket platform7  
 
                                                 
7On an international basis an additional technical solution can be added after the steel 
jacketed platform; the “Jack Up” rig. It’s a floating rig with (usually) three long steel framework 
legs that can be lowered to the sea bottom. With the legs placed on the seabed the rig is 
jacked up into position and used fort drilling and/or production. Due to its limited capacity for 
larger water depths, this technical solution has hardly been used on the NCS.     
Fig 17 West Navigator drillship © Seadrill
Fig 18 &19  Ekofisk steel jacket platform from the 1970s ©unknown, ©Dagens Næringsliv, 
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This type of rig/platform consists of a steel structure, placed permanently on 
the seafloor. This type of technical design was imported from use in the Gulf 
of Mexico at the start of offshore oil/gas operations on the NCS. The Ekofisk 
field, Norway’s first field to enter production was designed with this type of 
platform. Steel jacket platforms is used for production and has processing 
facilities onboard, and some of the larger platforms are also equipped with 
drilling equipment for drilling and servicing production wells. Much of the 
equipment is quite universal in the sense of possession of the production 
competence and access to material and production facilities. This type of 
rig/platform is used in the southern shallower parts of the NCS.   
 
Fig 20 Ekofisk steel jacket platform © unknown Fig 21 Oseberg Sør, a 1990s Steel 
platform © Hydro   
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The third is the (large) integrated Condeep platform  
 
 
Concrete Deepwater Gravity Base Structure (Condeep). Consist of large 
platform on top of large concrete structure with legs and seabed storage 
tanks. On top of the concrete structure, a large steel deck with drilling 
equipment, processing plant and all supportive structures. The platforms have 
capacity for simultaneous production, drilling and storage of oil. Riser 
structure and drillstring runs inside two of the concrete legs. According to 
Seiersted (1992) condeep were developed during the 1970s because it fitted 
the needs of several Norwegian actors. Condeep formed the technological 
core of the sc. “Norwegian model”. Almost exclusively used for the large 
oil/gas fields of medium water depths on the NCS. In later years sub-sea 
equipment has often been attached to these large structures.  
Fig 22& 23 Condeep GBS platform ©Statoil   Gullfaks Condeep GBS platform ©statoil 
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The fourth is the separate sub sea production system  
 
 
 
 
 
Sub sea equipment is control modules installed on top of the wells and is 
remotely operated from a nearby platform. Oil and gas are transported to this 
nearby platform through smaller pipelines. Sub sea systems have been 
developed gradually so as of today underwater separation of water and sand 
from the wellstream is possible. Water and sometimes gas is often pumped 
Fig24, 25 , 26 & 27  Sub-sea production equipment  ©FMC Technologies (all four) 
Fig 28 Sub sea production systems ©Statoil
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back to the reservoir through a sc. injection well to keep up the pressure in the 
reservoir. Drilling of wells, installation of equipment and well workovers are 
done with floating drill rigs/ships and with the aid of remotely operated sub 
sea vehicles (ROVs). Sub sea installation can be connected for production to 
all the different types of platforms as long as the rig/platform/ship is 
permanently in position. Sub sea equipment has been installed down to 3000 
meters water depth in foreign waters.   
 
The fifth is the Tension Leg Platform (TLP)  
 
 Fig 29 & 30 Floating TLP rig  © HRC-Corp  © Virgina Tech 
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A Tension Leg Platform is a floating concrete or steel structure tied to the 
seafloor with tension legs ie. steel struts extending all the way down to a set 
of suction anchors embedded in the sea floor. The platform is lowered in the 
sea so the updraft causes tension on the anchoring struts in order to increase 
stability. Fully integrated platforms with production, processing and drilling 
facilities exist as well as smaller production or production & processing 
platforms without drilling equipment. Early models had the sub-sea wells on a 
frame directly below the platform (between the suction anchors). Newer 
models have on sub-sea wellheads on templates that can be positioned at 
quite a distance out to the side of the platform with smaller seabed pipelines 
and/or flexible pipes run up to the platform.  
   
 
Fig 31Troll B concrete TLP    © Hydro     Fig 32 Steel TLP © Offshore technology 
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The sixth is divided processing between land and platform 
 
 
 
 
 
This design is based on the Condeep platforms structure, but is characterised 
by separation/movement to the shore of the processing equipment and the 
use of multiphase8 pipelines mixing dry and liquefied natural gas from the well 
                                                 
8Multiphase means that both dry gas and liquefied natural gas is transported in the same 
pipeline. It sounds easy, but in reality it has proved to be technically challenging because the 
unprocessed gas contains water and other contaminations that forms ice plugs and blocks the 
pipeline. The solution has been to mix the gas with glycol and/or methanol during the 
Fig 33 & 34 Troll A platform with limited gas processing equipment © Statoil   
Map and sketch shoving distance to land processing plant at Kollsnes © Norsk 
Oljemuseum  
Fig 35 Gas processing plant at Kollsnes © PSA
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site to the onshore processing plant, still with platform based production 
control and drilling. The platform retains the seabed storage tanks from the 
Condeep design. The system of Troll A platform & Troll Gas production unit at 
Kollsnes is the only example of this technical structure on the NCS. The 
platform was built as the last of the series of Condeep platforms and was 
commissioned in 1995. This unit is also the tallest of the concrete base and 
leg systems ever built.   
The seventh is the FPSO ship combined with the sub sea 
production equipment  
  
 
 
The Floating Processing Storage and Offloading ship (FPSO) is in principle 
similar to a floating production platform with the exception of the hull. The 
FPSO ship has the production and processing equipment and all support 
functions for production. Some FPSO ships also have drilling equipment and 
hence the capacity to drill production wells. In the FPSO ship there are 
possibilities to store and offload oil. Gas is normally transported through a 
pipeline after onboard processing. The hull structure with equipment with the 
exception of the processing equipment closely resembles a normal ship and 
                                                                                                                                            
transport phase. These substances have to be removed and recycled at the processing plant 
on shore. 
Fig 36 & 37   The Norne FPSO system  © Statoil © Statoil
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the technology for producing the hull is widely available. The types of FPSO 
ships used on the NCS are dependent on sub sea modules at the sea floor 
well heads. 
 
The eight is the platformless oil/gas field.  
 
 
This design is characterized with sub sea production including sub-sea 
removal of water and sand from the wellstream. The sub sea production and 
initial processing equipment must be combined with long multiphase pipelines 
and onshore processing of gas or gas & oil. The production control facilities 
are also placed on land, and the operation of the sub sea equipment is done 
Fig 38 , 39 & 40 The Snøvit platformless gas field currently under construction outside 
Hammerfest with the controlling, processing and loading facility at Melkøya  © Statoil  
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by remote control. Drilling of wells, installation of equipment and well 
workovers are done with floating drill rigs/ships and with the aid of remotely 
operated sub sea vehicles (ROVs). The two only fields with this design 
structure, Snøhvit and Ormen Lange are currently in the later stage of 
construction and are becoming operational during the autumn of 2008.   
 
2.4 Development of Advanced Drilling Techniques  
In 1989 Hydro drilled an experimental well with a horizontal tail end from the 
drill ship Petrojarl (Lie 2005:81). This was world first “horizontal” well drilled 
from a floating platform and represents the entry into what we can call 
advanced drilling on the NCS. The utilization of injection wells where gas or 
water was injected on sides of the deposits to push the oil/gas in the direction 
of the production wells was also important.  
Advanced drilling combined with new geological understanding and improved 
management of oil/ gas deposits grossly increased the recovery rate of oil 
from many fields on the NCS.  
 
During the 1990s this development in drilling and well technologies continued 
and during the late 1990s the first sidetracked wells on the NCS appeared. To 
sidetrack means that the drillers drill an additional well out from the walls of 
the original well. Over a few years this developed into three, four, five and six 
tracked wells.  
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The new and longer well tracks also lead to more complex down-hole 
structures. Wells could penetrate more than one oil/gas layer demanding 
down hole valves or plugs between the layers. A wellbore could pass through 
long stretches of loose formations demanding long sections of specialized 
sand screens. Or a wellbore could zig-zag horizontally for a considerable 
distance through the oil layer of deposit just meters below the gas layer or 
above the water layer.  
Not so visible and not so celebrated as platform developments, this new 
combined enhanced drilling techniques and more advanced utilization of 
oil/gas deposits represented the silent technological revolution of the 1990s. 
Fig 41 Drilling of sidetrack from a wellbore © Statoil         Fig 42 Three tracked well © Hydro 
Fig 43 Hydro’s artist impression of a six track well superimposed over Manhattan, New 
York to illustrate the sheer size/reach of wells when utilizing advanced drilling 
technology © Hydro 
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As an example; the Troll West field was during the first Troll development plan 
initially assessed to be unsuited for oil production due to its complicated 
geological structure. The field was re-assessed several times, developed and 
by 2003 it was largest field in terms of produced quantities of oil on the NCS 
(Lie:72).  
 
 
2.5 Safety Consequences of the Development of These Technical 
Designs  
The early designs, semi-submersible floating drill rig and the steel jacket 
platform were imported to the NCS. The designs were imported from a 
different surrounding setting both social and physical in the GOM. The TLP 
design was also imported. There is a chance that weakness in the structural 
design these platforms could be exposed with the changing conditions.   
Condeep, and much of the sub- sea equipment and the divided processing 
and platformless designs were on the other hand tailor made designs 
developed especially for the NCS. Here weakness can on the other hand lie in 
the limited numbers of unit and limited operational experience. Troll A is the 
only system in the world of this specific design and as such is a prototype.  
 
The use of larger sized platforms integrating more functions like drilling and 
production on the same platform add to complexity of the technological 
system. In general offshore platforms are by Perrow’s (1999) demands quite 
tightly coupled systems. Some of the platforms are tighter coupled than 
others. The integrated Condeep systems adds many wells to a platform where 
there are also drilling activity. On occasion drillstrings pass just meters away 
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from the wellhead of a substantial number of operational production wells. 
Some of the early TLP platforms hover in the water directly above a large 
number of operational production wells.  
 
The large integrated platforms with a large number of wells combined with 
advanced drilling technology increases the spatial reach and complexity of 
one integrated technological system dramatically. (Close you eyes and 
imagine you are straight above the 20 or so production wellheads. Then think 
of the picture above of the well superimposed over Manhattan, multiply the 
picture by 20 and imagine the wells running out from the platform in all 
directions around the full circle – both the size and the complexity is gross).  
 
An interesting international example for comparison; 
On the 1st of May 1991 the crew of the rig Pelican operating outside Trinidad 
and Tobago drilled into one of the rigs own wells at 4583ft (1389m) below the 
surface. The plan was to bypass the well by a mere 10 ft (3 m) at this depth. 
Later re-calculation showed that at a depth of 1000ft (300m) the two wellbores 
were only 2 ft (0,6m) apart. The consequence was a gas blow-out that lasted 
for 16 days before it was stopped (WOAD ref Pelican 1993-11-24/002)    
 
Development of independent sub –sea modules has had positive effects in 
relation to safety. The distance between the sub-sea templates on the 
well/wells and the platform can be increased. In relation to blow-out accidents 
this loosens up the tight coupling between the well and the rest of equipment 
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one usually finds on an integrated platform. This lessens the chance of a 
blow- out accident developing into disastrous scenario.  
 
The new drilling and field management technology lead to a substantial 
revision of the values of many of the oil/gas fields on the NCS leading to new 
assessments of the lifespan of a number of production facilities. This had a 
double sided effect as it meant platforms would on some occasion bee kept in 
service longer leading to old equipment in use. On the other side it meant 
better margins for investment in modernization or major overhauls of 
platforms.  
 
Rapid development of new major design structures meant that on average 
there has been 5-6 years in between the introduction of a totally new design 
concept. During the early-mid 90s three different designs, TLP-platforms, 
divided processing, and FPSO’s, were introduced almost in parallel.  
Knowing that the lifespan of a given rig/platform can typically be 30 years or 
more we see many different designs in parallel use. Though a few platforms 
have been decommissioned none of these designs has yet been abandoned 
and we see a diversified set of designs in use on the NCS today. 
 
Well service specialist travelling from platform to platform doing smaller 
specific task like certain types of wireline services had to work in shifting 
systems. Challenges are also posed to operators and operating companies’ 
knowledge of systems  
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This rapid diversification has had several consequences. 
It has been hard for safety authorities to keep up in developing the more 
detailed provisions of safety regulations suited to the particular systems 
design structure.  
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3. Theories on Social Causes of Organizational Breakdowns 
Leading to Errors  
 
Reasons for Selecting These Theories  
This group of theories are selected because they help in understanding how 
groups of humans in an organization whether formal or informal end up in a 
situation where one or more individuals have a higher than normal chance of 
acting erroneously.  
In other words the theories are relevant for understanding how the human 
organization and individuals acting within it becomes vulnerable to doing 
errors and especially errors at critical moments in relation to operating in the 
technological system.  
In the next chapter (Chapter four) I intend to analyse accident reports based 
on this set of theories. My purpose is to analyse the inner workings of the 
organization manning/operating the technological systems where the three 
accidents happened. I also intend to use the theories as basis for analysing 
one offshore organization under normal conditions where there is no accident 
(Section 5.1/5.2).  
In selecting the theories I have prioritized using theories explaining how errors 
occur or how humans in organization become vulnerable to making erroneous 
actions.  
For the reasons of clarity and usefulness I have avoided to theories on 
managing risk. These type of theories often explain causes of  vulnerability 
but the integrated part of the theory on how to control, mange or avoid 
accident risks will blur the image and I risk loosing clarity in the analysis.   
 
 
3.1 Karl E. Weick on making sense of it all  
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In his article “The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: the Mann Gulch 
disaster” (1993) Karl E.Weick, analyses how a group of elite smokejumpers 
(parachute fire-fighters organized for fighting forest fires) were overcome by a 
raging forest fire in the Mann Gulch in Montana in 1949. While conditions 
changed rapidly and developed into difficult and dangerous scenario, the 
social organization of the fire-fighting unit smouldered away: The unit stopped 
to work as group and when ordered to act in an unconventional way, to drop 
their tools and move out of dangers way in order to save their own lives, only 
a few of the fire-fighters obeyed the orders. The sad end of the story was that 
13 out of the 16 smokejumpers died.  
Analysing the events, Weick describes how an individuals understanding of 
the dangers in the surrounding environment is tied to social position. The 
individuals understanding and attribution to the social structure is dependant 
on the sense the individual can make of the social groups accepted 
understanding of the situation. When individual have problems making sense 
of the accepted common perception in a group, the individual will be prone to 
exit the social group and act independently on an own track. This will lead to 
breakdown of the social order/structure of the group.  
 
There is also a reciprocal effect, as long as the individual wants to be a part of 
the social group the individual sticks to the perceptions of the situation. To 
raise a deviating perception on how observations are connected and make 
sense, challenges the existent social order within the group. This can in 
situation where the groups social organization is strongly connected to 
specific way of making sense of the situation mean to exit the social group 
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Relevant for further analysis we see two effects; 
- a given participant will have problems making sense of danger signals 
lying outside the common understanding within the group the individual 
adhere to, and  
- when sensing the signals of danger and seeing an erroneous 
sensemaking  of a situation within the group, forwarding the perception 
of danger calls for challenging the social positions of members of the 
surrounding social group. A likely outcome is controversies or 
conflicting views on the interpretation or importance of danger signals 
in the period leading up to an accident   
 
In connection to assessing problems related to sensemaking it is interesting to 
look at complexity or more precisely perceived complexity.  
When technological systems are perceived to be complex by the individual, 
the struggle of making sense of a large set of “values” from a large set of 
“perceptions” with unclear or complex interactions can add problems to the 
individual’s ability to make sense of a given situation.  
 
Speaking out of starting point of the technical side of technological systems, 
sensors and instruments bringing forward a set of values/readings demand a 
type of assembly and interpretation against knowledge before the information 
makes sense for action among humans.  
 
 
3.2 Deborah Anchona and Chee Leong Chong on entrainment problems  
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Their 1992 article “Entrainment: cycles and synergy in organizational 
Behaviour” describes how the term entrainment developed from biology, 
where  
“entrainment refers to the process whereby an endogenous biological 
or behavioural rhythm is modified in its phase and periodicity by 
powerful exogenous influences”(ibid:5).  
 
Anchona and Chong state a slight modification from the biological 
understanding of entrainment when applying the entrainment term on 
organizations, the direction of influence can be bi-directional both from the 
internal to the external or the external to internal (ibid7). 
Describing entrainment in organizations, they further state that entrainment 
can be conscious, subconscious and instinctive. They also divide entrainment 
into three types, tempo, synchronic and harmonic.  
Their central notion is that entrainment is found where different parts of an 
organization, inside and outside groups or individuals start to work in 
synchronized fashion weather it is in tempo, synchronized cycles or mutually 
harmonic actions.  
For participants in a complex technological system a certain level of 
entrainment is usually critical for a systematic operation of the technological 
system. The problem of disharmonic entrainment arises in two ways  
- when different parts of the organization come out of harmonic, 
temporal or cyclic entrainment because one of the organizational 
elements enforces/or coerces another organizational element to act in 
tempo that is not suited to the tasks at hand, or 
- individuals are overachieveous, whether conscious or unconscious, in 
achieving entrainment with other organizational elements when this 
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goes against the necessary time to carry out the tasks at hand in a 
good manner 
 
As there is not likely that higher level management leading the organizations 
within a technological system wish for unsafe operations, this theory must be 
viewed in a sense that there are influences inside and outside the 
technological system of conflictual character to safe temporal, cyclic or 
harmonic entrainment of operations.   
In my analysis of organizations involved in accidents it is relevant to see if 
there has been signs of non- harmonical temporal or sequential adjustments 
between different elements of the social system or socio-technical system 
prior to the blowout accident; 
- work cycles that were obviously out of synchronization,  
- to long or to short time to carry out work operations safely  
- enforced temporal standards on work processes that are contested by 
involved groups/ or conflicting view on how long time should be used  
- enforced and contested views how specific work operations should be  
sequenced for proper/safe operation   
- individual persons taking on them to many tasks/working in to high 
tempo in order to impress or compensate for temporal problems in 
other parts of the organization  
 
. 
3.3 Trickle-down effects according to Diane Vaughan 
Diane Vaughan has based her research on the organizational causes on the 
disastrous accident with the space-shuttle Challenger in 1986. She has 
developed the theory of The Trickle Down effect described in her 1997 article 
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“The Trickle-Down Effect: Policy Decisions, Risky Work, and the Challenger 
Tragedy”   
 
She describes how opposing views on the organizations role and attached 
priorities from actors with influence outside the organization affects groups 
within the organization. Conflicting views, frames or understandings of the 
organization or operations role lead to alterations in priorities, related 
procedures and decisions within the organization. In some cases such 
alterations to the priorities, related procedures and decisions can lead to 
actions that jeopardize safety.  
 
Vaughans example from her article is how an altered frame for the space 
shuttle program from an “experiment program” where time were clearly 
subordinate to necessary checks and experiments to ensure safe operation to 
“production [of regular space launches] program” where the uphold of a 
programme of scheduled launches into space where dominating. Before the 
1986 launch of the high tech and complex space shuttle Challenger, the 
safety of operating the shuttles solid rocket boosters attached to the large 
hydrogen/oxygen fuel tank were in question. The rocket boosters were known 
to have a potentially dangerous weakness in the seals at the joint between the 
four sections of the rocket boosters. Exposure to low temperatures could 
cause the seal to give in and cause a leak of flaming hot gases out of the 
rocket booster toward the large flammable hydrogen/oxygen fuel tank.  
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On the day of the fatal decision to launch the space shuttle in temperature 
conditions that was soon to be proved it was not suited to operate under, the 
key question became put in the frame of producing regular launches. 
The question was turned into keeping the scheduled time for launch unless 
the engineers from the company that produced the solid rocket boosters could 
come up with decisive proof that it was unsafe to launch under this conditions.  
In other words we talk about upholding a production schedule instead of 
framing it as a question if all conditions were ready for launching the 
experiment vehicle into space. It would have been reasonable to expect a 
frame of experimental program to rule the decision considered the 
experimental character of the design/materials and limited operational 
experience with the space shuttle. Had a framing of an experimental 
programme been upheld, the question should have been more in the line are 
the conditions suitable for launch, and the burden of proof would have been to 
prove that all conditions were safe for the space shuttle to be launched.  
 
In analysing in relation to accidents I will look for: 
- has there been alteration of the frame the participants of the 
technological system view the technical system under.  
- are there conflicting views on how to frame the technological system, 
its operation or key operational elements (like for instance overall risk 
level) between different groups working within the technological system  
 
 
3.4 Scott Snook on Practical Drift  
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In the concluding chapter on his much apprised book “Friendly Fire – the 
accidental shootdown of US Black Hawks over Northern Iraq ” (2000) Scott 
Snook introduce the term Practical Drift. The book is a detailed three level 
analysis of the conditions leading up to US Air Force’s accidental shoot-down 
of two US Army helicopters over a No-Fly zone over Northern Iraq in 1994. 
Snook describes how, by the incremental adaptation of small practical 
deviations, the large, high tech and well trained US military airspace control 
and operations system ends up with making the disastrous decision of 
opening fire to its own helicopters. By analysing the conditions and 
background of the minor deviations done in the operating procedures he 
describes the underlying reasons for how the whole system failed and ended 
up with shooting down and killing 26 of their own members.  
 
Snook’s approach is quite close to Diane Vaughan’s Trickle-Down theory, but 
where Vaughan describes conflicting framing and the influences on leaders 
and critical decisions at the top of the organization, Snook looks more to the 
minor errors and small changes/deviations done to operational procedures 
done in good intentions by lower ranking members of the organization. Snook 
also look at how alternations to the original organization plan done with the 
intention of reinforcing the knowledge an competence in reality creates 
unclear conditions and confusion about responsibility at a critical moment.  
 
While Snook primarily writes about social organization, his writing is not free 
of techno-social value. He describes a story unfolding in a high tech 
environment and one central notion is how the airspace control and 
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operations organization and the helicopter pilots for a long time accepted 
missing radio communication when they did have the necessary means to 
establish direct communication (tough of a lower quality than usual). How this 
underutilization of the technical means settles in the organization is one quite 
important part of his study. Another is how to fighter jet squadrons with 
different equipment (different type of fighter planes) and background from 
different roles interpret their then identical tasks differently. The differentiation 
in interpretation leads to differentiation in in-theatre training creating a critical 
gap in key abilities with dire consequences at a critical point in time. 
 
Analysing in relation to accidents I will look for; 
- deviation from written/ established/ recognized operation procedures, 
The deviations can be in the technical to human interface or in human 
to human interaction. 
- shifting perceptions on key tasks in units/pats of the organization that 
should have seemingly similar tasks. As an example major differences 
between a night and a day shift in how they operate one important 
piece of machinery  
 
 
3.5 Anthony Giddens’ Trust at Distance 
I have picked a notion from a theoretical description, not developed for the 
organizational level but at general societal level. This notion, from theory put 
forward by Anthony Giddens in his book “Consequence of Modernity” (1991) 
become relevant because operation of offshore oil/gas platforms are closely 
associated with spatially distributed work. Giddens describe how trust at 
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distance became a key element in developing modern systems of 
communication, transport and trade.  
 
Because drilling and workover programs on offshore rig/platforms are run 
according to detailed plans developed specifically for the particular 
rig/platforms operation by a land based engineering/planning organization, the 
element of trust at distance is important.  
The land based planning/operation group is so closely associated with 
operation of the technological system that though I described how offshore 
platforms was clearly defined by physical boundaries I am willing to include 
such planning groups as part of the technological system when I do my 
analysis.   
 
Since Giddens in “Consequences of Modernity” does not give a qualitatively 
or conditional description on when trust at distance is good for efficient 
operation of modern systems, I will have to look for whether trust at distance 
supported safe operation or caused vulnerabilities   
In analysis in relation to accidents I will look for:   
- to what degree do we see elements of trust at distance between 
spatially distributed elements of this organization 
- to what degree do trust at distance support safe operation or create 
vulnerabilities  
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With these theoretical tools laid down and with a set of derived questions 
relevant to analysing accidents I will now proceed to the next chapter to 
analyse the three accident cases.  
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4. The Major Blow-out Accidents on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf - An Analysis  
 
Method  
I have analysed five reports in the three major blow-out accidents on the NCS 
in regard to the theories described in chapter three with the addition of 
Charles Perrow ‘s notion on complexity (Se section 1.2). I have also included 
an element on Social Construction Of Technology (SCOT) relevant for later 
analysis in chapter six:   
The five reports analysed are;  
NOU 47/1977 Bravo rapporten on the 1977 Bravo accident,  
NOU 16/86 West Vanguard rapporten on the 1985 West Vanguard 
accident,  
And three reports on the 2004 Snorre A incident;  
Brattbak, M., Østvold, L-Ø., Zwaag, C. v.d., Hiim, H. (2005) Gransking 
av gassutblåsning på Snorre A, brønn 34/7-P31 A 28.11 
Schiefloe, P.M., Mauseth Vikland, K. (2005) Årsaksanalyse etter 
Snorre A hendelsen28.11.2004. 
Ger Wackers (2006) Vulnerability and robustness in a complex 
technological system: Loss of control and recovery in the 2004 Snorre 
A gas blow-out 
I have put the findings from the analysis into a scheme; Attachment D to this 
report. I recommend the reader to use the attachment for detailed reference.  
 
 
4.1 The Bravo Blow-out Accident (1977)  
 
“On the 22 of April 1977 an oil and gas blowout  occurred in well B-14 on the 
Bravo production platform in the Ekofisk field…A workover is an operation 
performed on a producing well. It is generally a complex operation that may 
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involve serious risks. In the case of well B-14 the workover involved pulling 
approximately 10000 feet of production tubing from the well. For this type of 
workover, before the tubing is pulled the valves on the production deck the so 
called christmas tree, have to be removed and a special arrangement of safety 
valves, denoted blowout preventer(BOP), has to be installed. From the time when 
the christmas tree has been removed until the BOP has been installed the well is  
open and provisional means of assuring that it will not flow must be used. Before 
the Christmas tree is removed the well is killed with mud, which is a fluid of 
sufficiently high density to generate enough pressure at the formation depth to 
prevent oil and gas from coming out of the reservoir. In addition a mechanical 
safety device is installed in the production tubing, to prevent flow from the well. 
The blowout occurred during installation of the BOP. Before the Christmas tree 
was removed, a down hole safety valve (DHSV) had been installed as a 
mechanical safety device at a depth of approximately 500 feet [50 m - authors 
remark] under the rig floor, corresponding approximately to 110 feet [33m - 
authors remark] below se-floor. After the blowout was stopped this valve was 
found practically undamaged on one of the decks of the platform. It had been 
blown out of the tubing. The immediate cause of the blowout was that the DHSV 
had not been properly locked into the seating nipple in the tubing, at the time of 
installation during the night between April 21st and 22nd thereby failing to prevent 
flow of fluids when the well became unstable during the morning of April 22nd. In 
spite of this the accident was not unavoidable. Two warnings of abnormal 
conditions were received during the day of the 22ndAppropriate actions were not 
taken. The first warning came before noon when mud was observed flowing out 
of the control line coming from the DHSV. The second came when the Christmas 
tree had been removed, at approximately 16:30, when mud also came up through 
the tubing. Each of these warnings should have resulted in the immediate 
ceasing of the work and closing of the well.      
(Bravo report1977 – English summary:7) 
 
The Blowout lasted for 8 days, leaking an estimated 157500bbl (22500tons) of 
crude oil. The well was closed in by a US specialist crew with no lives lost.  
(Bravo report 1977:9) 
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Fig 45 Ekofisk Bravo platform blowout of oi l- to the left a supply vessel spraying water 
to avoid ignition of the oil   © Norsk Olje museum   
Fig 46 The wellhead on the Bravo 
platform after recovery 
© Norsk Olje museum 
Fig47  Oil blowing out through the 
derrick of the Ekofisk  Bravo platform 
© Norsk Olje museum  
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The Ekofisk 2/4 Bravo is an integrated jacket steel platform with production, 
processing and drilling capacity. It was one of the first platforms installed, and 
at the time of the accident the about two years old. A number of key personnel 
like for instance the drilling supervisor were foreign nationals. At the time of 
the accident 1200 wells had been drilled in the entire North Sea region. There 
were five known blow-outs, non in the Norwegian sector and the workover 
were allegedly the ninth workover on a production well on the NCS. The 
investigation committee also states that it have been difficult to get information 
about other incidents/ accidents on other regions, operating companies were 
reluctant to disclose information (NOU 47/1977 Bravo rapporten:21).  
The investigating committee also ran into a problem; at the time of the 
accident no operating guidelines/rules for drilling operations existed. There 
was only a valid rule set for floating installations. As the drilling and workover 
operations are very similar on these particular types of platforms it does not 
play a major role in relation to the accident and its outcome, but it serves as 
an interesting indication on the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate/Department 
of Industry’s capacity at the time.  
 
Examining the accident investigation report (NOU 47/1977 Bravo rapporten) 
and comparing with the theories on causes of organization 
vulnerabilities/breakdowns from chapter 3 there are numerous indications of 
problems in the days and hours  leading up to the accident. Most distinct and 
numerous are the indications of difficulties in sensemaking including 
controversies on how to interpret signals of dangers. There are also distinct 
sets of indications of disharmonic entrainment and practical drift in the form of 
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deviation from SOP.  
I do also find some indications on the fuction of the distributed onshore-
planning – offshore execution system functioned. There are some indications 
on the effect of trust at distance and whether to much or to little trust at 
distance were a contributing factor.  
I do not find that there are sufficient indications of cross pressure or conflictual 
framing to support a hypothesis on a Trickle-Down effect.  I will therefore 
leave this question open with a notion that the lack of clear indications can be 
related to the scope of the accident report and how it was written.  
 
Turning back to the question of trust at distance, the distributed system of 
onshore planning and offshore execution is briefly described (ibid 28, 50). The 
lack of redundancy and weak information transfer is criticised in the report 
(ibid:42, 50). It is clear that a more thorough check of the workover plan by 
competent personnel could have reveals weakness in the plan in relation to 
the installation of Down Hole Safety Valve. The DHSV was installed after the 
well was filled with mud. It later was later revealed that the first type of DHSV 
the wireline operators tried to install was not suited to be installed in mud. 
Also the lack of proper testing procedure of the DHSVs function before the X- 
mas three on top of the wellhead was disassembled might have been 
discovered by a proper cross check of the workover plan.  
The investigating committee’s assessment might bee a bit to brief in this 
matter to draw a very clear and distinct conclusion of information transfer and 
reliance on distant management.  In it self itself the lack of investigation of the 
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planning process is an interesting notion on the understanding, competence 
and systemic oversight of the investigators.    
 
Looking at whether we can see indications of problems in sensemaking 
among persons operating the system we find many indications.  
The wireline operators’ experienced problem in sensing if the safety critical 
Down Hole Safety Valve was correctly set deep down in the well. Their only 
tool was to use wire pull on the wire running down into the well (ibid:31, 39-
40)   
 
Also the drilling crew including drill-chief and drilling operator had problems of 
understanding why mud were slowly coming out of the well in the hours 
leading up to the accident  
"Drill chief tells that he found no reason to inform his superiors, as he 
was not sure there were floating more out of the production tubing than 
through the control line, and he viewed it possible that the cause could 
be the same. The commission finds his reasoning wrong and can 
hardly understand how an experienced drill chief could not recognized 
this clear warning of a blowout" (ibid:43 - Authors translation)  
 
Challenging one owns perceptions when facing complex technical systems, 
insufficient information and lacking oversight; 
"Drilling engineer were guilty of ...errors. In the choice between 
temperature caused expansion and instability in the well as an 
explanation for the increased pressure, he choose the least dangerous 
alternative, hence the temperature expansion" (ibid:42 – authors 
translation) 
 
Other persons working on the drilling deck also had problems of sensing the 
danger of mud slowly coming out of the wellhead (ibid:31 & 42) 
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Minor controversies could also be observed between several op the persons 
involved in the operations on the drilling deck.  
There was discussions over reliability of the chosen DHSV vs alternative 
equipment between contractor operating the wireline equipment and acting 
drilling superintendent (ibid:29). Knowing that it later showed up that the 
DHSV was not meant to be installed in a well with mud, there might be that 
the operator of the wireline equipment sensed something weren’t right.  
One of the other specialist contractors tells the commission he contacted the 
drilling supervisor perceiving something was wrong with the pressure balance 
in the well. 
“Drilling supervisor choose to accept drilling engineers explanation and 
decided to carry on with his work without seeking advice with his 
superiors" (ibid:42 authors translation) 
 
Still with these minor objections there is no description of anyone seriously 
challenging the drill chief or drilling supervisors’ interpretation that the 
observed abnormalities were just related to minor, not important deviations, 
and not indications of dangers in the form of an approaching blow-out. This 
point has not passed unnoticed by the commission investigating the accident. 
On the Drill chief;  
"It is surprising that none of his subordinates, including the shift 
supervisors, put forward objections against continuing the work when 
mud came up through the production tubing" (ibid:43 - authors 
translation)  
 
Elements of disharmonic entrainment can be observed. Contractors working 
with the wireline equipment had to try seven times before they got the DHSV 
in what they assumed was a set position, this lead to two work periods of 20 
and 30 hours respectively. (ibid 28 & 42) The contractors operating the 
specialist equipment were organized in a single shift. They where supposed 
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do shorter work sequences operating their specialist equipment. When the 
wireline operators ran into the problem of setting the DHSV and had to try no 
less than seven times this lead to very long work periods. 
Drilling supervisor slept for one hour during a 36 hour period just before the 
accident. He then went to sleep while the well showed abnormal tendencies 
with mud slowly coming out of the well.(ibid:43)  
It is worth noting that the drilling crew is organized so that drilling supervisor is 
working single shift while he supervises a two shifts, day and night shifts of 
drilling crews.    
 
When looking at the question of practical drift we must compare the findings 
against three key sets of rules canonical for any workover or drilling operation.  
- branch standards and general official safety rules/standards. The 
standard of always keeping two tested barriers can act as example  
- the second is the company and/or rig/platform specific operating 
procedures 
- the third is the drilling or workover programme 
In the investigation report I find several indications of deviations from this set 
of operating rules. There were deviations from the plan when installing the 
DHSV (ibid:29-30). When the wellhead x-mas tree was disassembled, the 
Blow Out Preventer (BOP) was not assembled and tested, but was in two 
parts. The crew assembling the BOP ran into problems because they did not 
know the particular type of BOP (ibid:34,38,43). The normal an expected 
procedure would be to have the BOP assembled, tested and hanging ready to 
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be lifted over the wellehead at the moment the disassembly of the x-mas tree 
started.   
Also the mud weight was not in accordance to the mud weight specified in the 
workover programme. (Ibid:29 & 38).  
The investigating committee also quite harshly criticises the later stages of the 
operation  
"A pre- planned on programmed workover job, in accordance with the 
demands of safety regulations par 99, where now replaced with 
improvisations, Differing views surface among the actors on which 
solution should be selected , and the decision process is not assuring" 
(ibid:39 – authors translation) 
 
 
4.2 The West Vanguard blow-out (1985)  
 
“Sunday the 6 of October 1985 at 20 30 an uncontrolled blowout occurred on the 
semi-submersible drilling rig West Vanguard during exploration drilling on block 
6407/6 on the Haltenbanken. A so called shallow gas blowout occurred during a 
routine drilling operation before sufficient progress was achieved to install a blowout 
safety valve.  
The gas diverter system of the rig did not withstand the forces of the blowing gas with 
it’s contained sand an solid particles and the gas flowed out onto the platform and 
were ignited. Explosion and fire caused grave damages. Of the 80 persons onboard 
79 were saved. The material damage to the rig runs into hundred s of millions 
Norwegian Kroner. … The drilling went along normally until the minutes before 2100 
when there were drilled into a thin sand formation containing gas at a depth of 263 
meters below the sea-floor. This sand formation was not proven by the pre drilling 
check of the [geological data of the – authors remark] drill site. This pre-drilling check 
had indicated a sand formation containing gas approximately 60 meters deeper, but 
also pointed out  - among other things based on previous experience from the 
Haltenbanken area – that one had to expect to meet shallow gas…..Drilling personnel 
circulated out the gas that entered the wellbore and continued the drilling. They had a 
new sequence of increasing gas values and further circulation. The next increase in 
gas measures were the blowout. (NOU 16/86 West Vanguard report 1986:7-8- 
authors  translation) 
 
 
At approximately 2300 the blowout had progressed fully and general 
evacuation alarm was sounded. During the following minutes under dramatic 
circumstances the crew attempted to divert the gas flow with the diverter 
system, releasing the riser connection at the se floor and moving the platform 
away from the gas plume by releasing the anchors on one side of the 
68 
68 
platform. As two explosions occurred the last personnel to evacuate 
experienced a dramatic evacuation and one of the crew went missing, never 
to be found. Two of the rigs crew climbed down one of the platforms legs, 
swam away from the platform and was picked up by a small craft from the 
stand-by vessel. After the life boats got away from the rig the personnel was 
quite easily picked up in calm seas by the standby vessel. A search operation 
for the missing crew member went on with helicopter and a number of vessels 
for some time without results. The well continued to blow-out with the same 
force for five to six days and the gradually calmed down. The rig was pulled 
away from the immediate area three days after the accident and towed to a 
repair site in the following days. (ibid 27-33)   
 
Fig 48 West Vanguard besides the gas plume from the shallow gas blowout  
©Canadian Wellsite Gallery   
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Exploration drilling is considered more risky than development drilling. 
Shallow gas eruptions is viewed as risk associated with exploration drilling 
(ibid:34)   
This accident was the first and so far only blow-out on the NCS where 
someone got killed. The rig was a new, only commissioned three years earlier 
and at that time of a modern type. Both the operator, Statoil and the rig 
operating company, Smedvig were Norwegian companies. Compared to the 
Bravo accident there were only a minor representation of contractors in the 
form of two specialist engineers The crew involved was Norwegian, with the 
exception of three crewmembers, the assistant drilling supervisor, a drilling 
engineer and a geologist in the land based organization (ibid:23-26) Though 
we se foreign nationals in a few key positions the majority of the crew 
including most of those in leading positions, were Norwegians.  
Fig 49 West Vanguard after the blowout – fire/explosion damage to the main deck and 
the list of the rig is clearly visible  ©Nils Aukan/ANS agency    
70 
70 
The exploration operation on the Haltenbanken area had commenced one 
year earlier 1984 and there had been drilled 10 wells in the area before the 
start of this particular drilling operatio. Looking at the situation on a large 
scale, the operation was a part of the major movement north on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. Exploration with following production had 
progressed far in the southern and northern part of the North Sea. Now the 
third sector was in the process of being opened up for production.  
 
Examining the NOU 16/86 West Vanguard report further we find that 
sensemaking is a clear problem in relation to the drilling operation. The crew 
had its drilling experience, company manuals of Statoil (the operator) and 
Smedvig (the drilling operating company) and the drilling programme with 
some geological data. Still considerable prpblems with making sense of whet 
was going on is clearly evident.  
While the drilling went on at about 2100 hours, the drill made a sc. “drill 
break”. The drill bit suddenly lost the down-hole resistance, the drilling system 
suddenly revved -up and dropped down a bit. (Ibid:27). In the period after the 
drill break there were two periods with high readings of gas in the mud and it 
was also unclear if mud was lost or gained at the top of the well. (ibid:37). The 
investigation report describes how the drilling crew had problems with 
assembling the different data from instrument readings and how there were 
problems with interpreting the gas measure readings in the mud returning 
from the well (ibid:46,59).  
The commission concluded that the drill break was into a pocket of 
underground sand 507 meters down in the well and that gas at first slowly 
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seeped into the well and formed a set of bubbles slowly rising to the surface 
(against the pressure resistance of the mud). This caused the first reading of 
gas in the mud, then the process repeated itself a second time, this time with 
higher concentration at the surface and at the third time, about two hours after 
the initial drillbreak, the gas had gathered sufficient pressure and momentum 
to push mud out and up through the wellhead and the blow-out started for full. 
(rf - ibid 49-52)  
 
As a part of the conclusions of the investigation report;  
“The drill crew have in this instance not seen and/or understood danger 
signals which with sufficient time could called their attention on what 
were developing" (ibid:72 – authors translation) 
 
The commission also calls for future improvement  
 
"Presentation of drill data should be made better"  
(ibid:73 – authors translation) 
 
There is only one report of controversy in interpreting the signals (ibid:67). 
The continued use of sg. 1.08 mud (light mud) was neither challenged. It 
seemed to be a quiet consensus among the drilling crew on using light mud in 
fear of cracking up the geological structures around the well (a real potential 
problem that can cause uncontrolled loss of mud into the formations around 
the well with the secondary effect of loss of down–hole mud pressure- 
author’s remark).  
 
The above information clearly shows that the crew had problems in 
interpreting the situation and its approaching dangers. Considering the lack of 
controversy reported the most likely explanation can be found in lacking 
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knowledge and/or lack of sufficient experience and/or lack of transferred 
knowledge on how the data could be interpreted and made into signals of 
approaching danger. The complex presentation of data (rf. - ibid:38-40,42-46) 
further enhanced the crews challenges in interpretation.  
 
Looking for indications of practical drift there were some deviations from 
SOPs. Both Smedvik and Statoil manuals states that there should be a break 
in the drilling while circulation of the mud in the well continues (circulation 
break) after a drill break. Also there was a deviation from the described 
method for gas measurement in the mud returning from the well. Some 
persons tested with an improvised “hand test” to feel for gas content in the 
returning mud and did not rely on the gas measurement instruments. The 
commission consider this method totally unreliable (ibid:46). This way of 
dealing with the difficulties in understanding the gas content in the mud can 
have contributed to the problems of interpretation of the measures of gas in 
the mud in the two hours leading up to the blow-out. Still there these deviation 
where not the primary/major cause to the blow-out, the lacking sensing of 
signals danger stands out far more clearly than the deviation from SOP. 
Compared to the Bravo accident (above) these deviations seem less of a 
general trend.     
 
The crew of West Vanguard tell the commission that they did not suffer from 
time pressures or were forced to work to long shifts. There was in other words 
no indication of entrainment problems within the crew. But there seem to be a 
problem in relation to the planning process, the crew received little time for 
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preparations (ibid:55) There were problems in transferring data on the 
geological conditions underground, between Statoils office for geological 
assessment in Bergen, Statoil’s  operation office in Harstad responsible for 
the drilling plan and the crew on the rig. (ibid:67).  
Also the drilling engineer in Harstad did not look through all documentation 
handed over from the Bergen office due to time pressure and knowledge of 
potential hazards did not pass out to the crew doing the job to a sufficient 
degree (ibid:54-55) Improper cyclic adjustment between those elements of the 
organization seems to have contributed to the lack of transfer of knowledge of 
geological conditions on the Haltenbanken.  
 
The problems with getting the plans ready also give an indication of the 
complexity of the land organization. As a result of previous years exploration 
drilling Statoils geologists in the Bergen office had knowledge from 
neighbouring fields on Haltenbanken, parts of the same geological structure. 
Still this information had to pass through the Harstad office and not all of the 
necessary information did reach the crew of the rig. The complex structure 
and sheer size of the documentation (rf ibid:55) contributed to the information 
not getting through. We see that the complexity and spatial distribution in the 
land organization contributed to a weak planning process.   
 
There where considerable trust from the West Vanguards crew toward the 
land organization. The continuation of drilling according to schedule when the 
drilling plans arrived late shows that there were no major incentives for double 
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checking the plans for drilling. Possibly there was to high a degree of trust at 
distance 
 
On the technical side there is important to note one point in the commissions’ 
findings. The commission pays much attention to the rapid failure of the 
diverter system (which were supposed to lead the uncontrolled gas stream out 
over the side of the rig).(ibid:58,70) (Ibid appendix 1:114 -124).Three 
important points raised by the commission;    
The commission describes experience from the use of diverter systems in 
blow-outs in the Gulf of Mexico. In 7 out of 18 cases the diverter systems 
functioned as intended, in 11 it failed.    
“As a conclusion…in spite of the diverter system on West Vanguard being 
among the best in use on contemporary rigs, it had grave weaknesses…This 
and earlier blow-out accidents have shown the diverter system to be unsuited 
to fulfil the tasks attributed to the system”. (ibid:58)  
and further on page 70 the commission states serious objections to keeping 
the drilling provisions demand for diversions system combined with marine 
riser as the sole approved solution in the phase before the well is secured by 
a Blow Out Presenter. (Drilling without marine riser would cause the gas to 
blow-out to the sea at the seafloor instead of blowing–out on the deck of the 
rig). I will return to this point for further discussion in chapter 6.   
 
One significant development can be seen when looking in between the lines 
of the commissions report. Compared with the report after the Bravo accident 
eight years earlier, this report spans much wider. There are discussion on the 
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relation between land and offshore organization. Both have quite lengthy 
attachments with technical research on key components, but the 1986 
WestVanguard is filled with recommendation for a larger number of 
improvements and there are recommendation of further research, among 
other things on buoyancy in relation to gas in sea problems, a question we will 
return to quite soon.  
The commission in some points had a pragmatic approach;  
“When it comes to safety norms and safety standards the commission 
will express that in the rule sets not can pose stronger demands than 
what is practical, both technical and economically. Not at least 
exploration drilling for oil and gas do by experience bring a 
considerable risk for accidents. When the activity are deemed legal one 
has to accept this” (ibid:69 – authors translation)     
 
 
4.3 The Snorre A Blow-out (2004)9  
The third case of a major blow-out I will look into is the Snorre A incident on 
the 11th of November 2004.  
Unlike the two earlier cases the three reports on the Snorre A incident are not 
official investigation committee reports. The first report on is the Petroleum 
Safety authority Norway’s incident investigation (Brattbak et al 2005), the 
second report is made by a research bureau on behalf of the operating 
company (Statoil Schiefloe et al 2005) , the third is a scientific research report 
the STS researcher Ger Wackers (2006). I primarily used these sources to 
take out factual descriptions. As the Ger Wackers report is built on the two 
first reports I have tried to stick to the principle on relying to the primary 
/closest sources to the actual incident used the two first reports as sources for 
                                                 
9 I have not been able to find any pictures of this incident 
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the factual descriptions and relied on Wackers report for information not found 
in the other reports.  
 
“On 28 November 2004, an uncontrolled situation occurred during work 
in Well P-31A on the Snorre A facility (SNA). The work consisted of 
pulling pipes out of the well in preparation for drilling a sidetrack. 
During the course of the day, the situation developed into an 
uncontrolled gas blowout on the seabed, resulting in gas on and under 
the facility. Personnel who were not involved in work to remedy the 
situation were evacuated by helicopter to nearby facilities. The work to 
regain control over the well was complicated by the gas under the 
facility which, among other things, prevented supply vessels from 
approaching the facility to unload additional drilling mud. After having 
mixed mud from the available well fluid chemicals, this was pumped 
into the well on 29 November 2004, and the well was stabilized”  
 
“The PSA characterizes this incident as one of the most serious to 
occur on the Norwegian shelf. This is based on the potential of the 
incident.” (Bratbakk et al. 2005:2) 
 
The situation developed when apart of the production tubing called a scab 
liner was pulled through the BOP. A suction effect caused gas to enter the 
wellbore, and from the wellbore gas found its way through a hole in the 
production tubing and through a damaged spot in the casing. The gas leaked 
outside the BOP and ended up leaking from the seafloor creating several 
craters close to the suction anchors and the well frame. A number of different 
gas alarms started to go off. This was first understood as problems with gas 
leaking from one of the process modules and into the cooling water, then 
other gas alarms went off in other places, the crew had problem finding the 
source of the gas. Most of the crew started evacuating by helicopter. About 
two hours after the first alarm, gas was observed in the sea below the 
platform. Situation had now become quite dramatic; below the platform 
substantial amounts of gas bubbled up and had entered the coolant circuits 
and fire deluge system. In the other end the pilot flame in the flame tower 
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could not be shut off. The main power generators were shut down and the 
emergency power system did not provide enough power to operate the mud 
pumps needed to mix heavy mud to counter the gas in the wellbore. While the 
crew were lifted off by helicopter to neighbouring platforms a skeleton crew 
remained onboard and started to improvise an operation to pump heavy mud 
into the well. During the night this operation slowly succeeded and by the 
morning after with all the stores of mud expelled the well became stable and 
was closed in. (Based on Brattbakk 2005 and Wackers 2006) 
 
Examining the reports for signs of trust at distance we se a shifting picture  
The Safety Authority Norway report describes a fragmented system of 
planning (Brattbakk et al:14-15). Also in the report from Schiefloe et al 
(2005:30-31) we find a description of major differences in offshore and land 
personnel’s view on the technical conditions of equipment on the platform. 
Offshore personnel also view land personnel to know little about conditions on 
the platform. Simultaneously we se a high degree of reliance among the 
offshore personnel in the onshore managements plan for the well recovery 
programme. Both drilling supervisor and drill chief signed off on the drill 
programme rather quickly and the drilling crew did not make any objections. 
Neither did the drill crew call off drilling and ask for a check in spite of things 
being done quite hastily. I find it difficult to draw a clear conclusion, ther seem 
to be a high degree eof trust on one side and a lack of open and good 
communication on equal terms at the same time. 
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Looking at the problems of sensemaking we se that there were problems with 
understanding deviations from the pre-calculated gas pressure. (Brattbakk et 
al :15) "to the crew on the platform the problems presented themselves as a 
strange pattern of pressure surges in the various compartments of the well 
and tubing at the drill deck" (Wackers:56)  
It took 2 hours and 6 minute from the first gas alarm sounded until the crew 
were able to confirm there was a blow-out.(Brattbakk et al :19) Initially the gas 
alarm sounded because gas bubbling up alongside the platform structure had 
entered the cooling waters of one of the processing plants. The gas alarms 
were attributed to a leak in this process system. The blow-out was only 
confirmed when crewmembers saw gas bubbling in the sea below  the 
platform (ibid:16,19).  
For the Crew to grasp that a blow-out were occurring happened first after the 
crew had been subject to the dangers of the gas from the blow-out for quite a 
while. The conception that there were two safe barriers down in the well was 
mentally and socially hard to break. 
 
There is also another side to the question on sensemaking. In the onshore 
staffs planning of the well recovery workplan none of the participants raised 
objections after alteration in the sequence (Brattbakk et al:25) 
Neither did the drilling supervisor or the drill chief raise questions, the 
programme were approved by all necessary instances (ibid:13).   
No one were able to grasp that when the scabliner (extra reinforcing liner 
inside the production tubing where the production tubing is damaged or worn) 
was pulled through the BOP after the down-hole 2 7/8 inch pipe had been 
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deliberately punctured only one safety barrier in the form of mud and casing. 
would remain. To operate with only one safety barrier would be a breach of a 
well recognized industry standard. Wackers (2006:54) point out that locally 
the decision to later sequence look smart.   
 
Disharmonic entrainment is also visible in the form of a failed sequence of 
planning the well recovery workplan in the land management organization. 
There was neither time to use relevant documentation. There was insufficient 
time for planning (Schiefloe et all 2005:20,26,28) There were also insufficient 
time for offshore leaders to supervise because of large burden of 
administrative duties (ibid:40). Temporal adjustment by starting well recovery 
operation two days earlier than planned due to the early finishing of previous 
job (Brattbakk et al 2005.37) caused last safety check of the plan in land 
management staff to be skipped and a hasty sign off by the drilling supervisor 
and drill chief. The onshore – offshore cyclic entrainment came out of 
synchronization and the cycles that should have carried out became 
disrupted.  
 
Looking at the recent history the higher management of the Snorre A had 
changed twice during the previous years. When Saga the operating company 
owning Snorre A after years with a of challenging economic situation was sold 
to Hydro and Statoil in 1998-99, the two companies agreed that Hydro should 
be operator for three years before handling over to Statoil. There were also 
some cost saving incentives in the agreement (Wackers 2006:33,35,38). 
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Though the people managing Snorre A had remained in the organization 
through these changes, they were exposed to new conditions. 
 
Two elements of complexity and tight coupling became important, not as 
causes of the grave incident, but in worsening the potential outcome. The first 
is that the emergency shut down of power productions (gas turbines) caused 
insufficient power to the mud pumps to pump mud into the well in order to 
push back/down the blowing gas. Also there was not power to generate 
nitrogen to use to extinguish the small flame on the tip of the flame tower (this 
flame normally burns continuously so that minor pockets of gas inside the gas 
venting system will be burnt off and will not cause explosions). So when 
switching to emergency power in order not to ignite the potential gas plume 
with the prime turbine power generators, there was not sufficient power to 
stop the pilot flame or pump down mud into the blowing-well, that’s a good 
example on what Perrow call tight coupling  
 
The second element is related to the platform being by its technical design 
structure a Tension Leg Platform (TLP) (se section 2.3/TLP-platform). This 
platform is designed so that it is anchored down by tension legs in each 
corner but at the same time floating. The problem with this design is when it is 
combined with a seafloor well frame with 42 wells directly below. If this 
platform should sink or capsize either because of loss of buoyancy due to gas 
in sea or because of damages from an explosion, it can potentially fall on top 
of its own seafloor well connections and damage them. This is why; 
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 “The PSA characterizes this incident as one of the most serious to 
occur on the Norwegian shelf. This is based on the potential of the 
incident.” (Bratbakk et al. 2005:2) 
 
Finally before I leave the Snorre A incident, I will look at the influence of the 
safety authorities: Below is a quotation of parts of the the NPDs10 press 
release dated 11 November 2003 after the previous safety inspections 
onboard Snorre A: 
“Background for inspection 
The background for inspection is the general increase in the number of 
reported gas leaks on the NCS in the 1998 – 2002 period.…In 2003 the 
Snorre field is among the Statoil operated fields with the highest 
number of reported gas leaks…The purpose of the inspection is to 
assess the Snorre A organizations daily monitoring of gas leaks, 
including registration, internal and external reporting, identification of 
causes, establishment, dealings and conclusions of actions. In 
additions ongoing and planned actions for the preventions of gas leaks 
on the Snorre A are assessed… 
 
Results of the inspections  
It has been both been conducted and are planned a number of actions 
helping to improve focus and prevent incidents stratified as gas leaks 
on the Snorre A…Signals from onboard management that one always 
has time to work in a safe manner are clearly communicated and 
understood in the organization. …SNA revealed no deviations” (SNA 
2003 - authors translation)  
 
Considering that the all the three reports (Brattbakk et al. 2005, Sciefloe et al 
2005 and Wackers 2006) all agree that there were weaknesses in the 
platforms technical condition and in the operating procedures of the crew and 
land organization running back for several years, this report is remarkable.  
My slightly harsh conclusion is clear; NPD (later SNA), had very limited 
influence on the safety level in the Snorre A operations leading up to the 
accident. One can also wonder if SNA’s very strict reaction with describing 28 
                                                 
10 NPD was divided into NPD and SNA onth e1st of January 2004. About two months after the 
inspection  
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breaches of rules little over a year later (Brattbakk et al 2005)11 is a recoil 
action to regain lost authority or even to cover up on weak controls. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 This lead  to Statoil later being issued a 20 mill NKR fine for breaching regulations 
mandatory by law 
83 
83 
5 Normal operations and cross case analysis with the 
accident cases 
 
Background for the interviews  
During the last parts of July and August 2007 I interviewed 14 persons 
working in the offshore part - completion phase of the Ormen Lange gas field 
development. I will first turn to explain the Ormen Lange project as context for 
the interviews  
 
5.1 The Ormen Lange project - completion phase 
- Carrying out challenging work on the forefront of offshore technology 
 
Overall picture of the Ormen Lange Project 
During the spring and summer of 2007 the completion phase of the sub-sea 
wells was the largest activity in relation to drilling, well completion and 
workovers on the NCS. The Ormen Lange project is one of two projects 
representing the eight step in technological design on the NCS, the 
platformless design (se section 2.3). The Ormen Lange gas field are to be 
constructed with two large sub-sea well templates, sub-sea processing unit for 
removal of sand and water, a double 80 km long multiphase pipelines and a 
processing and control facilities on land in Nyhamna on the Northwest coast 
of Norway. Quite unique is the depth of the sub-sea well templates and the 
lower part of the pipeline, the dept is approximately 800 meters.  
 
The gas field was confirmed through exploration drilling in 1997 and 
construction start was approved in 2004.(OED Factbook 2006:160) 
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Hydro is operator for the construction phase while Shell will be operator for 
the field when completed. Hydro are responsible for the construction of the 
land control and processing facilities The installation operations offshore are 
run with the somewhat strange organizational structure of Shell being sub-
contractor for drilling and completion of wells, FMC-Technologies provides the 
sub-sea units and the company Seadrill are contractors for the drilling and are 
providing the drilling ship for completion works. A number of smaller 
contractors are involved. Ormen Lange are considered to be among the major 
field development projects within the Norwegian Oil and Gas industry. 
(Information provided by Hydros information office and Shell employees)  
 
 
Fig 50 The onshore processing and control site in Nyhamna under construction ©Hydro/ 
Ormen Lange project homepage   
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Fig 51 Dimensions of the sub-sea well template for eight  wells with control equipment 
©Hydro/ Ormen Lange project homepage   
 
Fig 52 Dimensions of the sub-sea well template for four wells with control equipment ©Hydro/ 
Ormen Lange project homepage   
 
 
Fig 53 Artists impression of Sub sea well template containing wellhead control equipment, in 
the background start of 80 km double multiphase transport pipelines to land processing plant  
©Hydro/ Ormen Lange project homepage     
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Fig 54 Artists impression Ormen Lange sub-sea installation, two well templates, right and left, 
sand/water separation unit centre and start of multiphase transport pipelines upper right and 
background   ©Hydro/ Ormen Lange project homepage   
 
The completion phase  
The completion phase was only a part of the gigantic Ormen Lange project 
and ran in parallel to the completion work being carried out on the onshore 
processing plant and control systems. Prior to the completion phase the 
affected gas wells had been drilled and the 80 km multiphase pipelines  
transporting the unprocessed gas to the shore were laid.  
The completion phase can briefly be explained as consisting of:  
- cleaning out the wells after drilling, 
- installing the piping and cementing it,  
- installing the down hole-equipment (equipment below the seafloor) 
inside the well,  
- installing the sub sea wellhead control and safety equipment,  
- testing the integrity of the assembled well and control equipment for a 
multitude of situations  
- connecting the well head to the transport piping  
All is carried out from the drillship West Navigator at a water depth of about 
800meters 
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Fig  55 (left) West Navigator drillship ©Seadrill  Fig(right)  Workers on drill deck of West 
Navigator ©Hydro/ Ormen Lange project homepage     
 
 
Fig 56 Artist impression of completion work on Ormen Lange sub –sea well template 
NOTE Protective shields folded to the sides and  the exposed well-control assembly and blow 
out preventers. To the rear a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) used to do the actual 
operations at 800m depth   ©Hydro/ Ormen Lange project homepage   
 
Fig 57 Artist impression of completion work on Ormen Lange sub –sea well template 
NOTE Protective shields folded to the sides and  the exposed well-control assembly and blow 
out preventers. In front a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) used to do the actual operations 
at 800m depth   ©Hydro/ Ormen Lange project homepage   
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5.2 The interviews and observations – Ormen Lange Well Completion 
operations  
 
Methods and selection of interviewees  
During the last days of July and in August 2007 I carried out 14 interviews of 
people working in different positions for different companies that took part in 
the carrying out the completion phase of well number 3 on the Ormen Lange. 
Most of the interviewees had been involved in the earlier completion phase of 
well number one and two earlier in the spring-summer or were working on the 
planning of the fourth well already under way.  
The interviewees were employed in seven different companies working in tight 
relation while doing the completion work on the sub-sea wells. Selecting the 
interviewees I tried to get an equal a mix of “offshore” and “onshore people” 
and a mix of project management, planners, offshore supervisors and those 
who carry out the actual work on the drill-deck of the drillship.  
 
Shell/Exploration and Productio/Well services
- Overall project managment of 
drilling, installation and and completion of wells
Halliburton
- Provide packer
Expro Well services
- Surface testing 
- Flow well – collect data
- Wireline services
- Well Services Supervisor 
from expro 
FMC Technologies
- Sub sea equipment delivery
- Delivers workover control system 
- Sub sea installation
- Testing of equipment
Odfjell/Well Services
-Delivery and installation of  
tubing and screening
Baker Hughes
- Equipment 
Sea Drill
- Drillship operation
- Drilling
- Completion 
- Assisting Shell in planing drilling 
Schlumberger
- Equipment
- Specialist services 
Hydro/Oil and Gas division
- Prime operator of Ormen Lange gas field and processing facilities 
- Overall project managment of Ormen Lange  
- Land processing facilities 
Oceaneering 
- ROV operators
Legend
Interviewees 
Onshore 
Manager  
Offshore 
Supervisor 
Offshore 
Drilldeck 
worker/ 
equipment 
specialist 
Ormen Lange/Completion phase – cluster of companies 
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For a detailed list of persons, companies and positions see Attachment B.  
The interviews lasted between 40 and 65 min each and were carried out as 
semi structured interviews were I after a little introduction ran through a list of 
talking points with the interviewee. For the introduction and talking points see 
Attachment C. For the analysis se Attachment E &F  
 
I was also at twice present in Shell Well Services daily routine 
teleconferences between onshore operations management and offshore 
supervisors. I was also present on one daily teleconference between Seadrill 
operations management and captain and drill supervisor onboard the drill ship 
West Navigator.    
 
I analysed the interviews and observations in relation to the theories in 
chapter 3 through the help of the two analysis schemes Attachment E and 
Attachment F respectively. I recommend the reader to use these two 
attachments for reference.  
In the main text the interviewees are held anonymous because the interview 
group is small and some of the interviewees choose to answer anonymously.   
I have grouped the interviewees in three main groups;  
Onshore management (including management at equipment suppliers/service 
providers (6 persons) 
Offshore supervisors (4 persons) 
Offshore drilling operators/equipment specialist (4 persons)  
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Results  
The general impression is that the well completion project/Ormen Lange was 
run safer than most projects experienced.  Also with one person disagreeing, 
those of the interviewees with international experience viewed the Norwegian 
offshore oil/gas industry in general as safer than the normal situation in the 
international offshore industry.   
 
Looking at trust at distance first there is considerable communication onshore 
– offshore as well as vice versa. Details workplans are generated and 
transferred from onshore management to offshore. Considerable amounts of 
information go the other way also.  
Central in the completion process are a set of workplans called Complete Well 
on Paper (CWOP) provided by Shell. CWOPs are drafted and run through 
quite extensive planning meetings with the affected sub-contractors 
representatives present. . Sub- contractor/equipment suppliers personnel 
found it generally easy to get their views included in the planning process.  
“Shell is very professional and thorough in the way they plan the operation” an 
onshore manager outside Shell expressed, comparing the Ormen Lange 
project with earlier experience.  
 
The offshore personnel both supervisor and drilling operators/equipment 
specialists generally trusted the transferred plans. Most of the offshore 
personnel found it fairly easy to question the sequence or asking for the 
reasons behind a certain procedure in CWOP. Two of the interviewees 
express that they find Shells system rigid and finds it difficult to get necessary 
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procedural change. The amount of documentation was also felt to be too 
voluminous and detailed. One of the interviewees attributed this to a UK-
management style (Majority of the Shell management and supervisor 
personnel comes from the UK). 
Information distribution is important in keeping trust. Workplans were 
generally received in reasonable time according to one interviewee working 
as operator offshore. After reception the workplans were reviewed by 
supervisors but also operators had access to the plans before they were 
briefed. The offshore operators except one felt it was easy to ask for 
explanation for the reasons for a certain sequence or details in the workplans. 
The plan for different work phases were reviewed in planning meetings or pre 
- shift (handover) meetings. Smaller coordination’s and reviews of working 
procedures happened as toolbox – talks often.     
“Generally I find this system to function well” (Offshore operator) is a good 
description of how most of the interviewees expressed there view on the 
onshore planning – offshore operation/execution system.  
 
When observing the three daily teleconferences between onshore 
management - offshore Well Services Supervisor    and   Onshore 
management -  Captain/drill operations leader on drilling ship, I found the tone 
to be open, though the discussion was quite detailed when it came to 
program, logistics, operational procedures for well operations or safety issues. 
More often than not the agreed solution to problems was initiated offshore.   
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In relation to sensemaking the interviews did not provide sufficient information 
on whether those working offshore had problems understanding the 
operation. I did not observe any indications when I observed the daily 
teleconferences, but this is not sufficient to draw any conclusion. 
 
When it comes to the question of social barriers to challenge a common 
perception that a given operation is safe, so where there as mentioned earlier 
an open tone where the operators/equipment specialist explained that they 
could easily ask why certain details or sequences were planned as they were. 
On calling for stop in case of emergency these two quotations give good 
indications; 
"We try to push a culture where everyone can stop the process... 
because we don't know the people it is difficult to know if they will say 
stop" (Offshore supervisor)  
“Everybody has the ability to shut a well in if something is not going 
quite right” (Offshore operator) 
 
Two other offshore operators/equipment specialists expressed the same view. 
 
A challenge to getting a common and unified understanding of what is going 
on during an operation, especially in the area of safety, is the diverse 
procedures/systems of risk assessment. By different representatives from 
different companies using their company’s risk assessment 
methods/matrixes/systems chances of diverse opinions in case of a situation 
of doubt is increased. This is a consequence of the extensive use of sub-
contractors and specialist coming from different companies with different 
cultures.  
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Most assessment methods are based on the experience/knowledge of those 
present supported by experience gathered within a company in the form of 
handbooks/in some cases databases.  
 
On the question of entrainment problems most of those working as offshore 
operators/equipment specialist and offshore supervisors felt that they had 
sufficient time to work safely. The general notions where that it was stated 
that “Shell want us to work safely, they say take the time”.  
On a few occasions some had felt that they had been pushed on tempo to 
finish jobs according to schedule. This was on occasions with failures in 
equipment or other delays occurred. The push had come from offshore 
supervising personnel. I did not observe nor did any of the onshore staff 
report that they felt tempo to be too high.  
If there is tempo pressure it seems to be the offshore supervisors who are 
most “in the squeeze”. One of the supervisor explicitly stated he would like to 
be more in action, hands on with the team on the drill deck as supervisor he 
ended up spending to much time with office work. 
 
The role of being a leader, coordinator between groups of contractor teams 
and being responsible for communication to land (which obviously takes up 
quite a bit of time) seems the most challenging in relation to tempo.  
One supervisor stated that he would like to be more in action hands on with 
the team on the drill deck. As a supervisor he ended up spending too much 
time for office work while offshore. Logistics and equipment took much time.   
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An underlying notion of the need to keep up tempo is still there. The following 
quotations give an indication; 
"Time saving is important but not a reason for pushing. We have to 
work smart " (offshore supervisor)  
"They say we have all the time in the world, but that is not really the 
case....you can't just sit around not doing the job   
Shell is paying for a service and they expect to get that service we 
have to act professionally" (offshore operator/equipment specialist) 
 
This notion seems be more common to the whole branch than related to this 
project  
 
Also an element of conflictual framing can be observed,  
"A lot of politics involved in this project, and it hampers the 
decisions…Very political, even Shell finds it quite challenging to plan 
for this project"  
but  then the interviewee goes on to say;  
"Background of fairly high pressure on the Ormen Lange team...very 
high profile job, [Shell] still seems to be taking their time ...good to see, 
even there are lot of pressure on the project they are at times taking a 
step back ...you don't always see that with other companies"   
(Onshore manager)  
 
The impression that Shell has to manage two potential contradicting views on 
the Ormen Lange project is reinforced by another of the interviewees; 
“Much focus on the [Ormen Lange – completion phase] project, so 
Shell takes no chances” (Onshore manager)  
 
The complexity of the project can clearly been seen in two areas. First it is the 
technical challenges, this is the deepest sub-se wells on the NCS, the wells 
are also of a larger than normal dimension, and the technical design is of a 
new unique type.  
Looking at the organizational choices the project organization is larger than 
normal. There are a total of 11 companies with a total of 17 different 
departments supplying equipment or providing services (rf. the organization 
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sketch above, some supply equipment through other companies). The 
number of participating companies is far larger than normal for a well 
completion project. Leading managers tells that it is challenge to manage and 
coordinate among so many actors. The large meetings preparing the judged 
by some slightly rigid CWOP (workplan) are by key management at Shell 
considered a way to mitigate on the problem of complex organization.  
There has been difficult to get an answer on whether the complex 
organization was a calculated choice or just a consequence of the choice of 
using those companies that had the most expertise/best equipment/best 
contract conditions. As one of the key onshore managers said;  
"Uncommon project organization, never met it before in the industry 
….Don't know why this organizational model was chosen, difficult to 
comment on why this was cut up the way it was, I am aware that Troll 
was done in a kind the same way. There was an unusual allocation of 
work".  
 
It is also clear that the complex organization put some more strain on the 
offshore supervisors in their coordinating role. As a bi-effect of the 
organizational complexity  we see that this leads to a higher than normal  
number of personnel onboard the West Navigator drilling ship, in itself a 
general exposure to higher than normal risk.    
 
To transfer the views on how the interviewees experienced the project also 
has to include the positive attitude and expressed trust in the other 
groups/companies.  
Technical challenges and complexity can also affect safety positively by 
increasing the motivation, one young offshore operator made a statement that 
can be illustrating also for the view of some of the other interviewees;  
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"A big challenge for us to participate in such a path breaking project as 
long as it is so much new equipment and new things happening, its 
interesting". 
Looking at how the interviewees as whole answered; when it comes to the 
role of the Norwegian authorities safety control organization we see that 
Norwegian standards for offshore operations (NORSOK) are used by the 
onshore planers for reference to quite often, but equally if not more often are 
company guidelines used. The one providing the highest standard is preferred 
according to statements from key onshore managers.  
Offshore NORSOK is not used for reference, but company guidelines and the 
CWOP work programme are used extensively. These references are 
supported by on site risk-assessment tools like for instance the Task Based 
Risk Assessment (TBRA) used by Seadrill.  
 
The Norwegian offshore oil/gas safety systeme is based in an indirect model, 
where the companies are responsible for their own safety assessment, 
reporting and control. This must be the reason why the direct influence of PSA 
through inspections seems to be meagre at best. Of the 13 interviewees who 
answered, two onshore mangers had briefly met PSA personnel. None of the 
offshore personnel had met them during offshore work. 
 
 
5.3 Cross case analysis – three accident/incident cases and the case of 
normal operation  
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Comparing across cases problems of sensemaking is the most striking 
feature. Sensemaking problems are found in the build up to all three accident 
cases, in the non accident case (Ormen Lange ) there is not sufficient 
evidence to determine clearly if sensemaking problems are present. The 
general set up with remote sensing into what for the normal human senses 
looks like a deep black hole, demands interpretation to be understood to 
reasonable degree to operate equipment safely provides a major challenge to 
human sensemaking. This is inherent attribute of this type of technological 
system.  
In Carl Weicks theory (1992) the notion of the social conditions determining 
role in letting alterative ways to make sense of a situation come to expression 
is central. We find a common situation of hierarchal system where alternative 
views were difficult to bring forward in both the Bravo accident and the Snorre 
A incident. Contrary the openness and possibility to ask for verification 
observed in the Ormen Lange project seems to be of mitigative effect.  
 
Disharmonic entrainment was clearly present within the Bravo organization. 
This inside effect seems to be gone from the organization in the later West 
Vanguard accident, Snorre A incident and Ormen Lenge normal operation.  
But in all three accident/incidents there has been problems with the at 
distance onshore planning/management vs offshore operation. We also se 
some indications that there are some pressure in the normal operation 
situation at Ormen Lange. The distant onshore planning/management vs 
offshore operation/execution is a clearly vulnerable system. Improvement in 
communication systems and information transfer seems from the Ormen 
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Lnege observations to be helpful, but this technology was also available at the 
time of the Snorre A incident. Human/social organization in this spatially 
distributed system is still important.  
 
Trust at distance is a key element, but there is not a linear function between 
trust and safe operation. The crew on Snorre A trusted the distant planners to 
much. At West Vanguard offshore crews trusted plans and planners trusted 
offshore crews to interpret partial indications of shallow gas transferred with 
the drilling plans, they both failed in their trust. Safe operation seems best 
achieved when there is trust but with a full independent review offshore. The 
openness and possibility (at least partial) to communicate back questions and 
needs of clarifications seems to be important in the Ormen Lange project. In 
other words balanced trust, combined with sufficient time and openness in 
communication seems to be working best.  
 
Practical drift with alterations of SOPs has been present in both the Bravo 
accident and to a degree the West Vanguard accident. The best explanation 
seems to be the newness of both projects, and I find it reasonable to weak 
competence among operating personnel both at operator and supervising 
personnel. Lack of experience and/or lack of formal education were present in 
both instances.   
 
Looking at the technical design and complexity and coupling we se that 
offshore oil/gas rigs in general are complex and quite tight in coupling. This 
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can be seen by studying the integration and structure of different 
technological designs (rf. chapter 2).  
The combined production and drilling platforms are more complex and by 
combining those two functions on the same limited size platform the tightness 
of the coupling increases considerably and the major disaster potential of an 
accident increases beyond destroying the rig.  
The movement to smaller spatially spread sub-sea modules decreases the 
tightness in coupling in oil/gas production systems. But during the drilling, 
completion and workover phases which still will be done from a drilling rig/ship 
the coupling remains the same.  
The fact that I have only been able to identify conflicts in framing of the role of 
the technological systems in the Ormen Lange case seems to be a weak 
indicator. This might be related to method, the lack of indications on 
conflictual framing might be caused by limitations in the scope and content of 
the investigation reports. Only Ger Wackers (2006) report and the Scheifloe et 
al (2005) report look into the framing among outside actors of influence. And 
both reports show indications of effects from conflictual framing within the 
organization operating the platform. Ger Wakers (ibid) hold conflicts in framing 
between economic interests and operation demands as a key explanation of 
background causes.    
 
Looking at all four cases whether accident occurred or not, newness seems to 
be central across all cases.  
Bravo was new platform in a new industry; it was so new that safety rule-set 
for operation was not ready yet.  
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West Vanguard was a new platform in a new sector of the NCS, controlled 
from a relatively new operation management office with the quite new feature 
that it was a fully Norwegian manned operation.  
Snorre A did not happen with a new platform, but the platform was the first of 
this type of technical design on the NCS, the technical design had certain 
weaknesses that could increase the damage potential of an accident. Due to 
several alterations in the operation organization and change of drilling 
contractor the organization around Snorre As management end operating 
organization were new.  
Orman Lange is also new, Water depth, technical design and organization of 
completion crew is new.  
I will leave the description of newness here but it is relevant for further 
discussion.  
 
Finally I will look at the safety authorities’ influence or lack of influence in 
some cases. The 1977 Bravo accident shows a new organization that was not 
able to keep up in an expanding industrial sector. There is limited information 
except on the formalities in relation to the West Vanguard accident. The 
safety authorities inspection of Snorre A giving  “no remarks stamp” a year 
before the incident and then returning with a list of 28 breaches leading to a 
large fine a year later is a blatant example of lack of organizational self 
conciseness in a agency that is important for the welfare of a large number of 
people.    
To me this gives an indication that the safety authorities have developed into 
a more distant administrator and legal management agency than a hands-on 
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emitter of good safety culture. The Ormen Lange material indicates that 
company safety standards has bypassed much of the formal regulations in 
influence. In itself this is not necessary bad, it connects the economic with 
demands of safe operations within the same organizational unit. But we can 
end up in a situation where there are major differences between companies 
and/or installations. Both looking at what the interviewees said in the Ormen 
Lange material and comparing Ormen Lange and Snorre A as cases of the 
same time period, can indicate so.     
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6 The Socio - technological Context of the Blow-out Accidents 
 
6.1 Theories for understanding the contexts effects  
 
Social Construction of Technology  
Wibe Bijker and Trevor Pinch forwarded their theory on how technology went 
through a phase of shaping and selection where technology had to fulfil 
certain needs for the users before the technology were selected. The 
technology which fulfilled the needs best would through a process of selection 
but also alteration as a consequence of inputs before it was selected as the 
bearing technology (Bijker & Pinch 1987)  
 
 
6.2 The Socio – technological development of the Norwegian offshore 
industry  
In the anthology Oljevirksomheten som teknologiutviklingsprosjekt (The oil 
industry as technology development projec ) (Olsen & Seiersted eds 1992) 
describe the socio-technological historical development of the Norwegian 
Offshore oil/gas industry. Through the basis of SCOT-theory the authors 
describe three historic phases in the development of Norwegian offshore 
oil/gas industry; a technology import phase, a  Norsefication phase and a 
diversification phase. These are main trends and the shift from one phase to 
another is not exactly on date, but happened over some time. In the transfer 
periods between two phases technical and organizational trends from both 
trends could be visible. Also as I noted in chapter 2, the older designs of 
platforms and well systems had so long life spans so they continued to exist 
alongside newer technical designs and organizational structures. 
Modifications were done, but sunk cost set limits to how rapid technical 
structures could pass out of the industry.  
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I will describe the social technological context in the time leading up to the 
three blow-out accidents/incident. I will describe main development trend, 
technical design trend, social/organizational trend and the safety control 
authorities for each of the three phases.  
I have used Olsen and Seiersted (1992) and Lie (2005) as general sources  
 
From start in the 60s to 1975 – technological import  
During this period the main development trend was the import of foreign 
knowledge primarily from the major oil companies. The Norwegian 
government went into a exchange system by letting the companies take part 
in the exploitation of oil/gas resources perceived to bee public property in 
exchange for money in the form of taxes, assets in the form of investments 
and transfer of knowledge.  
 
The main technical design trend was transfer of designs utilized in the then 
only developed offshore oil/gas province, the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). From 
GOM came floating drill rigs and steel jacket structures (se section 2.3), but 
due to different operating conditions in weather and sea conditions some 
modifications were done. One class of technical design of rigs, the jack-up rig, 
made only a brief appearance on the NCS, before it disappeared. Equally 
important but not so visible is the transfer of organization models, knowledge, 
and safety standards. The organizational model was a hierarchical model 
within operating crew with extensive use of specialist contracting companies. 
This organizational model was different from the Norwegian model of 
industrial organization with more equal structures and where competence was 
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more in-house. During this period the safety control authorities had to be 
organized and manned. There was a heritage from the safety control of ships 
and this probably lead to two things. The safety control regime for floating rigs 
became divides with ship-control authorities control the “ship” capabilities and 
that the newly established Norwegian Petroleum Directorate gave priority to 
establishing safety standards and rule set for floating rigs first. In the later part 
of the period effects in the transfer of knowledge started to take effect. The 
Norwegian shipbuilding company Aker, developed their own floating rig 
design and the early Condeep structures appeared.  
 
Looking more specific at the time running up to the Bravo Accident in 1977; 
and looking at economic indicators, the oil price surged from 4 to 10 USD/bbl 
in 1973 while the platform were in the early stages of construction. In the 3 
years before the accident the price continued to climb from 11 to 14 USD/Bbl. 
Also the rate of offshore investment was in the range of 14-18% of total 
Norwegian investments, and the share of government revenue from offshore 
production picked up from 0 to 5 % in those years. (for revenue /investment 
data rf. Claes 2005: slide 19)(for price data rf OPEX statistical bulletin) .  
 
In other words the Ekofisk Bravo technological system were constructed, 
manned an came on operation during a period of rapid expansion and 
continued to operate in an still expanding industrial sector for two years before 
the accident.   
 
The next phase starting in 1975 and lasting to 1986   
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The main technological trend was the sc. “Norsefication”. The effects of 
technology transfer kicks in and production of the large Condeep platforms 
pick up. Condeep is adopted for utilization of Norwegian technology concrete 
and post-shipbuilding technology leading to a high number of Norwegians 
employed in the industry and revenues lead into the Norwegian society: A 
winning combination in relation to the needs in Norwegian society. The long 
legged condeps opened up for platforms in the middle depth areas of the 
Northern North Sea. To keep up expansion and divide the benefits of offshore 
expansion to the parts of society further north along the coast, exploration 
drilling starts in the Norwegian Sea from 1984.  
During the late 70s we get a number of strikes on offshore installations with 
demands for change in work conditions, pay and representation through trade 
unions. Organizational structure starts to get influenced by Norwegian culture 
of equality and participation, and Norwegians advance to leading positions in 
the offshore operations. The dependence of foreigners to provide knowledge 
is rapidly sinking. The New Norwegian public oil company Statoil also 
develops into having a dominating role through this period. After years with 
high rates of smaller accidents often with fatal outcomes, the 1977 Bravo blow 
out and in 1980 the grave Alexander Kielland accident with loss of 123 lives, 
the Norwegian safety control authorities are reorganized. Post 1981 the 
companies bear responsibility for its own safety control system and reporting. 
Where there are many contractors involved, the operators of a field are given 
a special role for safety coordination and control. The safety control division of 
the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate assumes a role of controlling the 
companies’ safety organizations  
106 
106 
 
Looking at the economic conditions in the years leading up to the West 
Vanguard accident we se that the oil price were swinging in the 27 to 29 
USD/bbl range and that Norwegian oil production increased from 490 000 
bbl/day to approx 800 000 bbl/day between 1982 and 1985. Offshore 
industry’s shares of total Norwegian invest hovered just below the 20% mark. 
Share of government revenue climbed rapidly from approx 15% to the late 
20s%. The share of export rose in those years to the mid-thirties. (for revenue 
/investment data rf. Claes 2005: slide 19)(for price data rf OPEX statistical 
bulletin)   
 
We see that the West Vanguard accident happened after a period of rapid 
advancement of the offshore oil/gas industry. Share of total invest had 
become high, revenues were high and the oil price were good. But this high 
level of investment had forced structural adjustments in the production 
industry. In 1983 the Norwegian government started to use stable investment 
rate as a messure for how many field developments the government approved 
(Seirested et al: 262). A necessary consequence is that new fields had to be 
found so there were room for keeping the investment rate into the future, 
another type of expansionism.   
 
The third is the post 1986 diversification phase 
The main technological trend is diversification and a little later 
internationalization. Post the 1986 dramatic drop in the oil prize, different 
designs started to appear on the NCS. New designs like sub sea production 
units, Tension Leg Platforms (TLP), FPSOs and divided offshore – onshore 
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processing (se section 2.3) appeared as solutions to keeping the cost down 
while simultaneously moving production into deeper waters. Advanced drilling 
techniques to utilize the fields better and improved transport solutions for 
unprocessed gas was a part of this development. In this phase we still se a 
continued element of expansion on the NCS, but by the early - mid 90s both 
Norwegian equipment/services suppliers and oil companies moved were also 
moving out into other oil/gas regions and the international market.  
 
After the drop in the oil price in 1986 from the high 20sUSD/bbl down to 
8USD/bbl, a short drop in offshore industry’s share of total invest happened. 
Before the commissioning of the Snorre A in 1991 the price had partially 
recovered to the 14-18 range. The offshore industry’s part of invest quickly 
picked up to the level of before 1986 and in 1991-92 passed this level and 
went beyond in spite of the now lower oil prices. At the same period 
government revenues picked up from the low level of 1986-88, but at a lower 
level in the 10%range. National production figures for oil continued to increase 
from 1,8 mill bbl/day in 1991 to 3 mill bbl/day in 1996 for then to stabilize at 
this new level.(OPEC Statistical review –table 39) Gas production also 
increased in the same period.  
This was achieved both by more production units being commissioned/more 
fields started production, and increased production on the developed fields by 
among other efficiency improvements, enhanced drilling techniques (se 
section 2.4) The oil/gas part of government revenues, though shifting a bit, 
increased more than the climbing oil price in the period leading up to the 
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millennium. In other words production efficiency and results measured by 
economic outcome increased.  
In the 1999 – 2004 period the oil price first surges to high in the 20s then 
drops to mid 20s for two years for the to rapidly surge to mid 30s in 2004  
(OPEC Statistical bulletin- table 73) Offshore industry’s part of investment 
decreased and stabilized at mid-low 20s during the later part of the nineties 
and the first years of the new millennium.  
Snorre A was constructed and commissioned in a period where the offshore 
oil/gas industry recovered from the effects of the price drop of 1986, where in 
operation at the time the Norwegian offshore industry both continued to 
expand and production increased both a result of new field s coming into 
production, but also because increased production results from each 
production unit.  
 
 
Social construct of safe operations 
Supported by the theoretical basis from Bijker and Pinch (1987) and 
supported by empirically by Olsen & Seiersted eds (1992) we have seen how 
social conditions have been shaping technology in the offshore oil/gas 
buissiness. Technical designs, social organization and are not only shaped by 
the availability of technology or determined by technological development. 
Equally social conditions shape technology. As we have seen under certain 
conditions we can trace ellemnets that causes vulnerability to a technological 
system. Vulnerabilities can be seen as embedded across the whole industry 
across time, differences in technical deigns or organization. As example we 
see that with the problems of sensing what’s going on inside a well that to the 
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human eye literately is a black hole going deep into the earth; independent of 
platform designs or organization of the workforce the operators have 
problems with interpreting what’s going on. New instrumentation has been 
added, but so has scope, possibilities and dimensions in drilling the wells 
also, the ability to sense comes out about equal.  
As a second example, putting people drilling equipment processing plant, 
helicopter platforms, etc. onboard such a concentrated area as an oil/gas 
platform is to make a technological system that has built in tight coupling. The 
environment in the form of sea and water depths called for this. Independent 
sub-sea modules improved this somewhat, but still there are considerable 
chances of problems causing major destruction to platforms. Platformless 
designs might solve this problem, but these technological systems are still to 
new to draw any reasonable experience to verify this.  
When studying the three accident cases we also saw that causes related to 
the organization varied from case to case. Technical items whether failing or 
operating correctly were involved, but certain aspects of social organization 
could be linked directly to why technological systems failed.  
 
As I have kept the basic notions that the technical design, social interactions 
within the associated organization and the social-technical interactions within 
a technological system must function for the system to operate safely. As we 
have seen technological systems is being affected by outside social 
conditions, whether we look at technical design or social organization, so I 
find it reasonable to say that there is a social construct of safe operation. 
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Vulnerabilities can be avoided or mitigated by design or by social 
organization.  
 
Safety is not operating as the sole independent condition one want to achieve. 
Safety is competing against other central condition one want to achieve with a 
technological system. There will be a number of conditions competing for 
priority in the development and operation phase of a technological system. 
Also these conditions are often dependent of each other.  
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7 Technical, Social, Socio – technological Context and the Major Blow-
out Accidents - Assembling it All.  
 
 
7.1 The individual blow-out accidents/incidents  
Bravo  
Direct causes to the Bravo accident, faulty installation of the Down Hole 
Safety Valve, the lack of ready Blow out Preventer  and the inability to react to 
the slowly flowing well, can be traced back to set of underlying causes in the 
social organization or the socio- technical integration. The negative outcome 
of rapid expansion and quick technology transfers manifested itself in the 
organization in the form of entrainment and deviations/inabilities to follow 
operating procedures leading to vulnerabilities. Organizational elements that 
could act mitigative to the dangers posed by rapid introduction of new 
technological systems like the security control organization and also 
knowledge gain were out phased.  
 
  
West Vanguard  
The rapidly expanded role of the oil industry’s share of national income, the 
high level of an need for continued investment, and need for district incentives 
all worked in conjunction to create conditions contributing to the conditions of 
vulnerability observed in the West Vanguard case. Drive for exploration 
drilling in a new area and more complex land management organization, 
leading to loss in the information transfer between land and offshore. Also the 
Norsefication process lead to this being a total Norwegian accident, this raises 
the question of whether sufficient knowledge was transferred.  
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Comparing to observations in safety assessment processes on the Ormen 
Lange project we se the central role of experience among those present. It is 
reasonable to view this as central organizational attribute onboard the West 
Vanguard also. A question is if the now Norwegian organization had matured 
sufficiently to have sufficient knowledge onboard.  
 
We can also se a technical element left over from the technological transfer 
phase. The inherited emergency diverter system was left with the usual 
design on this kind of platforms. The knowledge that these systems were not 
reliable as safety precautions were not transferred from the GOM to the NCS 
An increasing number of different design elements were through expansion 
going to be mixed with alteration of the supporting organization.  
 
 
7.2 Across cases  
 
Complexity  
The embedded problems of humans in making sense in the complex coupling 
between the natural, sea, engineering knowledge and human organization 
can be seen across all cases whether there are accidents or not. This can 
partially be attributed to the complexity of offshore platforms and rigs as 
technological systems. The lack of direct access and need for sensing 
through instruments seems to be a key parameter   
 
Trust at distance 
The onshore – offshore planning –execution system is dependent on trust to 
function, but looking at Bravo, West Vanguard and Snorre A cases the level of 
trust has been to high. On the other hand with too little trust there will be zero 
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benefits of the onshore – offshore planning execution system. The crew of the 
rig would be cut of from management support and competence. Trust at 
distance seems to follow a inverted U – shape in relation safety. In the middle 
where there is sufficient trust to function efficiently, but still checks and control 
with material the best function of trust at distance seems to be.  
 
 
Expansionism  
In describing the Snorre A incident, Ger Wackers has attributed the grave 
incident to problems in stable performative closure between the Economic 
and Engenering realms. Framing the operation in these two opposing ways 
caused pressures on the organization and causing vulnerability and ultimately 
exposing the technological system to a grave incident. I agree with Wackers 
that economic vs. engineering framing is a good explanation to the Snorre A 
case. But neither in the case of Bravo nor the West Vanguard accident were 
there economic pressures. On the contrary the accidents happened after 
periods with high market prices and almost unlimited access to investment 
money. I am also of the opinion that reducing the problems down to two 
conflicting frames, though well augmented for by Wackers, is to reduce the 
complexity of background causes to much. Complexity and development 
paths leading to complexity are in it selves interesting as causes.   
 
The phases of technological import and the Norsefication process marked the 
period leading up to the accidents on Bravo and West vanguard. I have sais 
earlier that newness is a repeating attribute between those cases. Comparing 
to the historical development (ch 6 ) and looking at the many technological 
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designs introduced in short time (ch 2) expansionism is the unifying 
descriptive term. Snorre A was the first of its kind of technical design on the 
NCS. Troll A with its divided offshore-land processing and Ormen Lange are 
in reality prototypes. In its eagerness to establish the offshore oil/gas industry 
as sources of welfare the Norwegian state/society has showed an aggressive 
expansionism.  
At times leading up to the Bravo blow-out accident safety control authorities 
and most likely, necessary operating knowledge were lagging behind. These 
elements balancing expansionism and protecting against vulnerabilities were 
not present to a sufficient degree.  
In the West Vanguard accident the complexity of a newly expanded operation 
management system was not able to transfer the knowledge of potentially 
dangers to the crew and possibly the crew had insufficient knowledge to 
absorb the dangers and act accordingly. Critical supporting structures and key 
knowledge related to safety did not develop in pace with the rapid expansion.  
On the other hand high engineering competence worked both as driving force, 
but for many development projects also as mitigative to accidents by 
engineering standards and safety design checks.  
 
7.3 Generalization  
Methods  
First it is relevant to look for vulnerabilities and causes of vulnerabilities when 
explaining causes of accidents. Vulnerabilities can be found coming from both 
inside and outside a given technological system, it is in halting interaction 
between the different elements I have found the explanation. The interaction 
between the different elements can be inside, outside or through the 
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technological systems boundaries. Equally the causes of vulnerabilities can 
be manifested in organization, social surroundings and the technical 
design/technical sub-systems or in the interaction between these elements.  
Though conclusions can seem to be complex and not clear cut to the reader I 
uphold my starting point of multi faceted analysis to identify causes of 
accidents. It is also necessary to analyse by the step of vulnerabilities.  
 
General Causes  
Looking at these cases of accident within the offshore industry on the NCS 
the striking feature is that accident happened quite rapidly after either 
expansion or changes. New conditions outpacing the organizational structure 
have been a repeating pattern.  
The drive for introduction of the new technology, first by import of technology 
and know-how, then by taking over and running the business on Norwegian 
hands has lead to rapid expansion, especially in certain phases of surge. The 
social drive for establishing and sharing spatially the effects of this expansion 
can be seen. Maybe in reliability and accident sciences we can do away with 
the picture of the old run down facility as the prime cause of accident    
 
For the individual - An onion of risk attribution factors  
Returning to the introduction to this thesis and Ulrich Beck description of risk 
distribution and the individual, we se through the examples from this accidents 
that risk to the individual worker inside these examples of advanced 
technological systems, that risk is constituted through social organizations 
and effects in several social layers around the individual.  
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Ultimately, in the long run the drill deck worker is not only affected by her/his 
relations to those whom she/he works with or the machinery in the immediate 
surroundings. The risk is constituted by the technological system and its key 
sub-components of technical structure shaped by design, organization 
including knowledge and situational interpretations. But again the 
technological system is part of larger industrial sector shaped by demands 
from a larger society and solutions for fulfilment of these demands. 
Operational safety of potential dangerous systems and safety of the workers 
has both been important features in design and operation of technological 
systems. But safety is not a sole individual and independent feature above the 
rest of a technological systems design and operational criteria’s. Safety is a 
feature that is partly built in and partly upheld in the heavy socially influences 
processes of design, selection and operation of technological systems. In this 
process vulnerabilities and hence risk to the workers and other individuals 
relating to the technological system is consciously or unconsciously moved 
within the system and between the system and its surroundings. The 
individual workers ability to assess risk and to control risk and hence affect 
her/his exposure to risk is limited as consequence of the complexity and 
interactions of modern technological systems.  
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in the onshore planners are needed from the offshore 
personnel  
p:67 problems in transferring information on the 
geology/well condition to drill crew
p:14-15 Fragmented system of planning well 
operations
p:23 "A challenge or weakness in RESU is the 
quality assurance. The engineers are sitting so 
tight together in the planning process that we get 
no one to double-check: We are humans 
altogether, and possibly we are not good enough
to challenge each other"
p: 26 Alteration in the sequence of pulling scab-
liner and punching hole in 2 7/8 tailpipe, caused 
loss of initial barrier with BOP (second barrier) 
open. This sequencing is the same as planning 
with only one barrier (the primary barrier - casing 
+ mud) 
p:29 Drill crew do not stop operation and check 
procedures before pulling scab- liner. Trust in 
onshore planning. (related to lack of proper 
revision by drill supervisor and drill chief two-
three days before.  
p:9 NEGATIVE Difficult to question onshore 
planning from offshore 
p:19 Group think in relation to conditions of well 
??? 
p: 30 NEGATIVE Differing perceptions on 
technical condition of equipment between 
onshore and offshore 
p: 31 NEGATIVE Offshore personnel view land 
personnel to know to little about the offshore 
status and conditions 
p: 35 NEGATIVE Lack of integration between 
SNA/Onshore and the rest of Statoil/RESU  
p: 46 Lack of integrative decision processes both
onshore and offshore 
p:52 NEGATIVE The lack of involvement of 
drill organization lead to loss of information
H2. (Weick) Difficulties in sensemaking p:31/39/40 Wireline tools causes problems in 
sensing what's going on when setting DHSV 
valve. After seventh attempt DHSV is assumed 
to be set 
p:31/42 Problems with interpreting causes of slow mud 
flow out of the well 
p: 42 "Drilling engineer were guilty of ..errors . In the choice
between temperature caused expansion and instability in 
the well as an explanation for the increased pressure, he 
choose the least dangerous alternative, hence the 
temperature expansion" (my translation)
p: 43 "Drill chief tells that he found no reason to inform his 
superiors, as he was not sure there were floating more out
of the production tubing than through the control line, and 
he viewed it possible that the cause could be the same. 
The commission finds his reasoning wrong and can hardly 
understand how an experienced drill chief could not 
recognized this clear warning of a blowout" (my 
translation)     
p:27/p: 37 Problems with making sense of 
drill break combined with high gas 
measures in mud 2 - 1hour 
before well blew out. 
p:37 around 2200hours,  Unclearity on whether 
mud was lost or gained   
p: 39-40 Problems with assembling the 
different data from instrument readings 
p: 46 Lack of understanding in weakness 
in gas test of mud procedures - problems 
with interpretation 
p 54 Complexity of drill programme posed 
challenges to sensemaking 
p:59 Problems with understanding and 
interpretation of gas measure/readings in mud 
p:72 " The drill crew have in this instance not 
seen and/or understood danger signals which 
with sufficient time could called their attention 
on what were developing" (my translation) 
p:73 "Presentation of drill data should be made better" 
(my translation) 
p:15 deviations from expected pressure 
reactions in mud system caused no reactions 
p: 16 problems with relating first gas detections 
to a gas leak, erroneous readings attributed to 
failure in process equipment in the Vigdis gas 
processing module
p:19 2 hours and 6 min after first gas alarm were
blowout to sea confirmed
p:25 No one in the planning process were able to
grasp that both the first barrier (casing + Mud) 
and second barrier (BOP) would be open at the 
time of the puncture of the down-hole 2 7/8 inch 
tail pipe      
p: 55 Not understanding consequences in 
puncturing 2 7/8 inch tailpipe before pulling 7 
5/8 Scab liner
p:56 "to the crew on the platform the 
problems presented themselves as a strange 
pattern of pressure surges in the various 
compartments of the well and tubing at the 
drill deck" - problems in sense making 
H2 B. (Weick) Controversies over signals of dangers p:29  Discussions over reliability of DHSV vs. other 
equipment between OTIS operator (wireline contractor ) 
and acting drilling superintendent 
p:33 OCT- operator perceive something is wrong with 
pressure balance in the well, says he contacted drill 
supervisor
p:42 "Drilling supervisor choose to accept drilling engineers
explanation and decided to carry on with his work without 
seeking advice with his superiors" (my translation).
p:43 On the Drill chief "It is surprising that none of his 
subordinates , including the shift supervisors, put forward 
no objections against continuing the work when mud 
came up through the production tubing" (my translation)    
p:52 No challenges to perception from fear of destroying
rock 
structure by using heavy mud for safety, and the 
continued use of (sg. 1,08) mud 
p: 67 Conflictual views 
p: 29 Controversies over whether pulling scab 
liner through BOP were a dangerous operation 
requiring special permission  
p:9/ 20-21 Difficult to pose questions onboard 
the rig 
p: 32 Difficult to pose critique 
H3. (Ancona & Chong) Disharmonic sequencing or tempo caused by 
entrainment  
p: 28/42 Some contractors had 20 and 30 hours work 
period because there were no night shift 
p:43  Drilling supervisor slept for 1 hour during last 36 
hours  
p: Drilling supervisor and Drill chief are on single shift - 
disharmonic cyclic entrainment with two-shift for rest of 
crew
p:55 Little time for preparations for 
offshore drill crew due late arrival of 
drill programme from onshore.
P: 67 NEGATIVE no report on insufficient time and time 
pressures to carry out the drilling 
p:13 Programme approved by all necessary 
instances
p:37 Temporal adjustment in planning and 
approval procedure (due to drilling of previous 
well were finished earlier than expected)  
p: 20 Disharmonic cyclic entrainment in planning 
work operations
p: 26  Disharmonic temporal entrainment in time 
for leaders and central persons to read 
documentation and go through the mandatory 
procedures for safety control
p: 28 Prevailing answers to the reasons for 
procedural breach. Not sufficient time to use 
safety documentation or not sufficient time to do 
as required in procedures 
p:38 Confliction framing between production and 
time to work structured and after overall plans
p: 40 Insufficient time for both onshore and 
offshore leaders to supervise because of large 
burden of administrative duties  
P: 55 Need for more time to coordinate 
complex operations 
p: 56 The two day early finishing of previous 
drill job and the decision to start work on 34/7
P31A two days earlier and skip final safety 
assessment - sequential disharmonic 
entrainment 
H4. (Vaughan) Conflictual framing or view on role p:10 Conflictual perception on role of leaders 
onshore and offshore - administrative duties vs. 
actual on site leadership
p:20 Conflictual framing on the role of risk 
assessments in Saga vs. Statoil 
p: 29 Cross pressure between short term 
production demands vs. the need for long term 
systematic maintenance 
p:38 Conflictual framing between production and 
time to work structured and after overall plans
H.5(Snook) Alterations of SOPs p: 29 deviations from plan to use DHSV  and not to use 
salt water before killing with mud
 p:29 Drilling superintendent decides to change plans and 
install DHSV with out conferring
p: 30 deviations from plan when installing DHSV in mud 
p:34/38/43 BOP not assembled and ready when well is 
opened
p:38 Mud weight not as stated in workover programme
p: 39 "A pre- planned on programmed workover job , in 
accordance with the demands of safety regulations par 
99, where now replaced with improvisations, Differing 
views surface among the actors on which solution should 
be selected , and the decision process is not assuring" 
(my translation) 
p:51 Provisions in Phillips safety handbook not followed  
p:41 deviations from Both Smedvik and Statoils drill 
manual
Circulation break (from drilling) not carried out last two 
hours despite occurrence of "drill break"
p: 46 Lack of trust in gas measurement and use of 
improvised "hand test" in mud
 p:14 Puncturing down hole safety valve without 
sufficient barriers.
p: 32 Deviations from drill operators SOP of 
having safety back up equipment (kill stand) 
ready when piping are pulled through the BOP 
p: 37 Offshore personnel on SNA dependent on 
constant adjustment and micro coordination  
p:54 Locally decisions on the well recovery 
work plan look smart
H6.(Perrow) Complex interactions and-or tight coupling p: 28 Contractors and organizational complexity
p: 30 Mixing of very similar parts in BMH- plug - causes 
malfunction 
p: 37 Insufficient detail information about wells technical 
solutions and conditions available
p: 49 Discussion on the complexity of the organization 
p:61 Ventilation intakes in 
close proximity of drill deck helped 
to spread gas before explosion
p:41 Complexity in organization cause confusion 
when Smedwigs Asst Drill Chief thought that Statoils 
Asst Drill Supervisor had done circulation check after dri
break and vice versa
p:3 SNA is a floating TLP  platform anchored 
above a well frame of 42 wells. Tight coupling 
by design.
p:13 Programme approved by all necessary 
instances
p: 23 Potential of destruction of well frame of 42 
wells
p:21/41 Impossible to close pilot flame on flare 
when main power were cut
p: 26 failure of transformation about knowledge 
of wells weaknesses. 
Complexity in information handling systems
p:31 Lack of overall overview barrier safety after 
alterations to initial drill programme 
p:33 Kelly cock (Driveline safety valve) blocked 
by skirts around top drive (in derrick) To tight 
coupling 
p:41 Emergency power supply to small to run the
necessary pumps for the emergency kill 
operation when main power were closed down 
and engines of the cement mixing machines took
air from underneath the platform. Tight coupling 
x 2     
p:11 Floating TLP platform anchored above well 
frame of 42 wells 
p:28 To complex safety documentation. The 
individual user are not able to utilize safety 
documentation 
p: 44 Lack of understanding of the reality of 
failed outer casing (13 3/8 casing) under the 
failed pressure test in 2003
p:54 Locally decisions on the well recovery 
work plan look smart
p: 55 Tight coupling in a well workover 
operation
p: Uncoupled decisions in a tightly coupled 
system  
H7 .(Bijker & Hughes) Negative design effects 
because of social influence on technological choice 
p:21 1200 wells drilled in the North Sea 
5 known blowouts + a few more 
p: 21 First Blowout on the NCS 
p. 23 Deep of Industry/Oljedirektoratet responsible 
p: 26 platform 2 years old
p:59 Lack of inspections from authorities
p:21 Law demands on the 
use of marine riser and diverter system for this type of 
drilling
:p23-26Three positions of  knowledge 
on the rig/ in the drill organization held by foreign 
nationals (remains of the technology transfer project)
p:36 From GOM data - Diverter systems 
known to fail in11 out of 18 incidents/accidents.
Still by regulations the mandatory solution
p:62 the deviation systems leading of gas to the 
platform deck - the whole set up of marine riser 
and deviation system is in generally to unreliable.
p:54 Complexity of the organization and 
weaknesses in transfer of data 
p: 68 Statoils internal safety organization
p:70 complexity of government safety organization
p:9/36 Rapid change of operators Saga-Hydro-
Statoil 
p:9 Change of drill operators 
p:22 Accident potential 
p:24 Internal safety revision (Statoil) did not 
reveal weaknesses in planning procedure for 
drilling and well operations - weak execution of 
government regulations
p:7/ 20-23 Rapid organizational changes in 
period leading up to the accident
p:11 Floating TLP platform anchored above well 
frame of 42 wells
p:34 Fragmented organization with contractors. 
Contractors dependent on getting renewal of 
contract and find it difficult to raise critique 
Additional information 
Date 22 apr 1977 lasted for 8 days p:34 Shallow gas eruptions were 
viewed as a known risk when doing exploration drilling  
p:69  "Not at least exploration drilling for 
oil and gas by experience considerable dangers for 
accidents" 
p:28 Weak system for distribution earlier HMS 
data.
p:4 Breakdown in multiple levels and units in the 
organization 
p:21 Reference to the Norwegian welfare 
state 
p:21 Challenging to get information on blowout accidents 
because of operators secrecy about accidents 
p:34 7reported shallow gas eruptions 
20 known incidents before 1982 + some additional up to 
1985
Known to be in the same area (Haltenbanken)  
p.:9 High activity on SNA p:5 Incident description p: 22 Laws and standards, description of the 
hierarchy 
p:22 amount of oil 22500 tons (157500bbl) p:10 Known weaknesses in well casings P:5 Technical condition of SNA p:30 Government ownership in Norwegian oil 
companies 
Statoil 100%
Hydro 51%
Saga Private 
+ Some history  
p: 50 The role of work programs described p:13 Programme approved by all necessary 
instances
p: 11/29 History of SNA p:40 Contract conditions Driller - operating 
company 
p:54 Internal control system  p:23 Potential of maximum damage + number of
persons involved 
p:13 Well scheme of 34/7-P31A p:50 Drilling of sidetracks 
 p:17 Formal vs. informal organization (as 
relevant for analysis)
p: 51 Information on the well 34/7-P31A
P: 38 Effects of informal organization p:52 Description of alterations to original 
drilling plan with consequences 
Observation of Shell Daily Teleconference 
22/8/2004
Observation of Shell Daily Teleconference 
28/8/2004
Observation of Seadrill Daily Teleconference 
28/8/2004
Test against hypothesises 
H1: (Giddens) Considerable trust at distance 
Good communication and influence on planning 
from offshore to onshore 
Good communication and influence on other 
companies planning from 
Indication of good communication  - improved 
trust at distance 
 Detailed information (report) on 
past 24 hours and plans for next 24 
hours shown on screen gives detailed status 
Status is comparable with Shells operation document 
Complete Well On Paper (CWOP) (brought by some 
participants)
Detailed information (report) on 
past 24 hours and plans for next 24 
hours shown on screen gives detailed status 
Status is comparable with Shells operation document Complete Well 
On Paper (CWOP) (brought by some participants)
Information about upcoming critical flow test (of well) were in 
the process to be given to the crew
Clear leadership and quality in open planning from 
onshore to offshore 
Uncontested clear leadership improves trust at 
distance 
Detailed discussion with rig 
supervisor around technical issue 
of safety relevance - Onshore Well services Team leader 
underlined safety 
Detailed discussion with rig 
supervisor leading around questions about 
settings on an alarm system on drill floor 
- several aspects of this minor case discussed until agreement 
Good work relation with those one can talk directly 
to
Poorer with those distant (clear/marked 
difference)  
Much higher degree of prefference for direct 
contact indicates lack of trust at distance   
Discussion about when operation of third well would be 
finished 
Offshore set conditions accepted by onshore HQ
Discussion raised from HQ around a riser chute - West 
Navigators view that  operator error was a part of the 
problem and a procedural review were quickly accepted 
High degree of trust in onshore plans when they 
are being executed offshore 
Indicates trust at distance 
Deviations from plan without approval 
Practical drift - deviations from SOP   
Supervisor on rig were leading the 
discussion when it came to a point
 with technical discussions of safety relevance  
One safety issue raised from 
supervisor on West navigator about 
personnel being in to close proximity 
to heli deck when helicopter landed - support 
for rig supervisor for reporting and 
supervisors plan for action on the issue 
Rig supervisors view were upheld in 
discussions around alarm settings 
High amount and good quality in communication 
onshore- offshore and offshore - onshore 
Improves Trust at distance 
H2 A. (Weick) Difficulties in sensmaking Discussion about unexpected 
values of pressure testing on 
well - questions on how this 
should be interpreted 
H2B (Weick) Controversies over signals of dangers NEGATIVE Information from offshore supervisor around unexpected 
pressure readings when testing - supervisor did not see any dangers 
and 
wanted to continue - calm discussion in HQ ended with the conclusion 
that values were within limits and operations could continue  
Low barriers for individuals to halt operations 
when problems arise  
Indications of low conflict level in relation to 
sensemaking problems 
Commonality in risk assessment methods 
High degree of commonality improves 
sansemaking in crisis 
H3. (Ancona & Chong) Disharmonic sequencing or tempo 
cH4. (Vaughan) Conflictual framing or view on role 
H.5(Snook) Alterations of SOPs 
H6.(Perrow) Complex interactions and-or tight Question from rig supervisor on "Who's going to sign the work 
permit"
The mitigation procedure for doing the risky work with open 
well 
(work permit from control room) is not fitted to new 
technological 
design structure (platform less) at Ormen Lange 
Considerable uncertainties on West Navigator and Seadrill 
HQ about how much time Shell would devote to testing of x-
mas three and BOP (well equipment components) - 
discussion in HQ inconclusive 
 
Clear understanding of own role and 
own groups role as part of the whole 
High degrre of understanding has mitigative 
effects on complexity 
Low degree of understanding indication on 
complexity 
Common perceived risk/danger picture 
 
Common view on consequences of worst 
case accidents 
Common scale and scope of worst accident 
risk 
Commonality indicates reduced complexity 
Fragmentation show indicates complexity 
Good cooperation between companies 
Mitigative effect on complexity 
H7.(Bijker & Hughes) Negative design effects 
because of social influence on technological 
choice 
Outside influences affects the choice of technical, 
organizational and procedural solutions 
Indications for analysis of SCOT (CH 6)  
Government control
National vs. Company vs. Rig/ship safety culture 
Impact of national safety regulations 
Impact of Company /Rig/Platform safety 
regulations 
Substantial time devoted to security reports on minor things  
Use of official safety regulations/standards  
Gommonly used - higher effect of national safety 
standards    
Control or personal contact with PSA 
Effects of government safety monitoring through 
direct control 
Additional information 
